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THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD
“CUSTODY” LITIGATION: USING
BUSINESS BRANDING TECHNIQUES TO
TRANSFORM SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
ELENA B. LANGAN
I.

∗

Introduction

Divorce negatively affects children;1 no one claims
otherwise.2 Child custody litigation as part of a divorce action3
is even more damaging.4 Those seeking to modify parent
behavior through amendments to custody statutes designed to
lessen the acrimony often associated with child custody disputes,
reduce the number of cases requiring judicial intervention, and
encourage successful shared parenting post-divorce should
consider how corporate branding principles can be applied to
achieve these goals.
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor, Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law. J.D., University of
Maryland School of Law. Florida Bar Board Certified Emeritus Specialist,
Marital and Family Law. I would like to thank my colleagues, Michele
Struffolino and Megan Chaney for their invaluable suggestions,
encouragement, and support, and my research assistants, Donna McMillan,
Brianna Jones, and Tara Mulrey, for their assistance on this project.
1. Elena B. Langan, “We Can Work it Out”: Using Cooperative Mediation
– a Blend of Collaborative Law and Traditional Mediation – to Resolve Divorce
Disputes, 30 REV. LITIG. 245, 252 n.31 (2011).
2. There is some support, however, that undergoing a divorce is less
damaging to children than being raised in an environment plagued with high
levels of marital discord. See Sol R. Rappaport, Deconstructing the Impact of
Divorce on Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 353, 359 (2013).
3. Although “divorce” will be used throughout the article, the same
concepts apply to paternity cases where parenting responsibility and the
apportionment of a child’s time with each parent is contested.
4. Langan, supra note 1, at 252-53 nn.32-35. See also Linda D. Elrod,
Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L.
REV. 869, 898 (2007).
∗
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“Branding” focuses on altering consumer behavior by
creating favorable impressions regarding a product, service, or
company, typically to increase sales.5 An example of the impact
branding can have is the rebranding of Healthy Choice, which
enhanced public perception of the quality of the company and its
products.6 ConAgra’s frozen food entrees were originally known
as Diet Deluxe, a name that conjured up negative images of
tasteless, dietary deprivation accompanied by unfulfilled
cravings.7 The new name, Healthy Choice, and rebranding
campaign projected a positive image suggesting the product
offers a fit and healthy alternative as part of an active lifestyle,
leading to increased longevity.8 This is just one example of a
successful name change and rebranding campaign in a business
context.9 The name change itself, without the accompanying
efforts to alter the public perception about the product, however,
would not have achieved the goal of increasing the company’s
share of the frozen food market.10
Child “custody” litigation could similarly benefit from a
rebranding. Several states have eliminated “custody” and
5. James Heaton, The Difference Between Marketing and Branding,
TRONVIG
GROUP,
http://www.tronviggroup.com/the-difference-betweenmarketing-and-branding (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
6. Michael Rader, Can Changing Your Company Name Save It?,
BRANDROOT (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.brandroot.com/resources/item/55can-changing-your-company-name-save-it.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Other examples include: 1) “Philip Morris Companies,” the owner of
Kraft Foods and Miller Brewing company, in addition to the tobacco company
bearing its name, became “Altria” in 2001 to distance itself from the negative
perceptions associated with the tobacco industry; 2) “Quantum Computer
Services” became the hallmark of online services after its name changed to
“America Online” in 1991; and 3) “Andersen Consulting” became “Accenture”
in 2001, after separating from the Arthur Andersen accounting firm,
successfully avoiding being tainted by the Enron scandal that ruined the
accounting firm’s brand as a premier financial consulting company a year later
when it was found guilty of obstruction of justice in 2002. Kurt Eichenwald,
Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with Obstruction
in
Enron
Inquiry,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2002),
www.nytimes.com/2002/03/15/business/enron-s-many-strands-investigationandersen-charged-with-obstruction-enron.html?pagewanted=all;
Corporations,
FAMOUS
NAME
CHANGES,
http://www.famousnamechanges.net/html/corporate.htm (last visited Jan. 4,
2016).
10. See Heaton, supra note 5.
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“visitation” from their statutes, replacing them with the more
neutral terms “parenting plans” and “parenting time.”11 In
addition to changing the nomenclature, state legislatures have
shifted the burden of resolving these conflicts to parents,
requiring them either to develop, adopt, and abide by a
parenting plan, or submit a proposed plan to the court if unable
to agree to the plan’s provisions themselves.12 Proponents of
these legislative changes aim to eliminate the perception that
there is a “winner” when custody issues are litigated, reducing
the incentive to compete for the award through judicial
intervention and eliminating the animosity associated with
those cases that are litigated. It is difficult to pronounce these
endeavors a success. There is no evidence that the statutory
revisions have achieved the desired decrease in acrimonious
litigation between parents; instead, there are indications that
the opposite has occurred.13
While the legislative goals are laudable, the lack of a social
behavior rebranding campaign to create a favorable impression
among “consumers,” i.e. parents, about the benefits derived
under the new statutory schemes may hamper efforts to achieve
the objectives. In addition, mere changes in nomenclature are
insufficient to accomplish the legislative purpose. Even where
revised terminology has been accompanied by substantive
changes in custody standards, there has been little change in
parents’ behavior.14 In order to transform the tenor of custody
disputes into a cooperative enterprise between parents,
“custody” must be rebranded so that parents embrace the
nomenclature changes and adopt behaviors designed to achieve
the new goals. Rebranding efforts to achieve enhanced outcomes
for parents and their children confronted with custody disputes
in divorce cases should be geared towards modifying perceptions
of “custody” by altering the underlying mission and value
proposition15 through: changes in the decision-making process;
garnering support from internal constituencies16 (lawyers and
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See discussion infra Section IV.B.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra note 178.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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judges); harnessing continuity of the emotional response
associated with “custody” awards to educate parents about the
advantages of the new paradigm;17 striking a balance so that
innovations in custody standards do not surpass public
understanding of those changes;18 and consistently using the
“brand” both in state statutes and throughout the litigation
process.19
This article discusses how rebranding principles, already
being used to alter social behavior in other non-consumer
contexts,20 could be utilized to accomplish the legislative goal to
reduce litigation as well as diminish animosity in custody cases.
Part II of this article discusses the impetus for a transformation
in the way parents view custody disputes. Part III discusses
basic branding principles and how companies establish a brand
and can successfully change their branding. Part IV explores
the evolution of the current custody brand, identifies eight states
that have eliminated “custody” and, in some cases, “visitation”
from their vernacular, and discusses, in detail, changes to
Florida’s custody statutes as part of the rebranding of custody
litigation. Part V examines Florida’s experience with statutory
revisions by considering appellate cases and practitioner
commentary since the amendments to the state’s custody
statutes went into effect to identify areas that demonstrate a
failure at successful rebranding. Lastly, Part VI analyzes the
implications for a successful attempt to rebrand “custody” and
suggests that capitalizing on the psychological and emotional
responses to rebranding could aid in achieving the universal goal
to reduce the animosity associated with custody litigation.
II. The Impetus for Changes in “Custody” Litigation
Despite the collective efforts of legislators, judges, lawyers,
legal scholars, and mental health experts, not to mention
parents, legal disputes over children following divorce persist.
While significant levels of stress for both parents and children

17.
18.
19.
20.

See discussion infra Section VI.A.
See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Section VI.C.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
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can be anticipated throughout the divorce process, recent studies
suggest that within a few years after the divorce has been
finalized, most children have adapted to their modified living
arrangements and exhibit comparable psychological functioning
to peers whose parents did not divorce.21 The exception,
however, may be for those children that experience high levels
of parental conflict during the divorce process with disputes
continuing in the years that follow.22
The number of high-conflict divorces is relatively small. The
vast majority of divorcing couples exit the marriage with
relatively little conflict and resolve their disputes without
judicial intervention.23 Cases that are litigated often involve
high-conflict custody disputes.24 In addition, the parents
involved in these cases typically engage in post-decretal
recidivistic litigation, consuming the majority of judicial
resources.25 There is no universal agreement on the appropriate
method for handling high conflict custody disputes. To date,
while strides have been made in encouraging settlements
through alternative dispute mechanisms (made mandatory in
some jurisdictions),26 custody litigation has not been eradicated,
and its demise at any point in the future is unlikely. Experts
remain undeterred, however, and new initiatives are regularly
touted as the panacea designed to ameliorate the animosity
associated with contentious battles.
One slowly evolving trend is to eliminate words such as
“custody” and “visitation” from the nomenclature used in
custody statutes. The thought is that different terminology may
21. Rappaport, supra note 2, at 359.
22. Id. at 363.
23. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137-38 (1992) (suggesting that 90%
of divorce cases are settled without a trial).
24. Christine A. Coates et al., Parenting Coordination for High-Conflict
Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 246, 246-47 (2004). It is estimated that 8-12% of
divorce cases involve chronic high-conflict disputes between parents. Id.
25. See Robert E. Emery & Kimberly C. Emery, Should Courts or Parents
Make Child-Rearing Decisions?: Married Parents as a Paradigm for Parents
Who Live Apart, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 382 n.50 (2008); Gerald W.
Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q.
201, 214 (1998).
26. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.10 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2002).
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cause parents to behave differently. Despite the old adage that
“a rose by any other name would still smell as sweet as a rose,”
there is support for the argument that the labels ascribed have
an impact on perceptions and influence behavior and attitudes.27
A parental relationship with a child, however, is so fundamental
that simply rebranding how that relationship is characterized
through nomenclature changes is unlikely to shift attitudes
towards custody litigation.
States adopting the changed
nomenclature have, in many instances, also altered the
standards and process for making custody determinations.28
These combined modifications in statutory provisions make the
concept of “custody” litigation an appropriate “product” for
application of rebranding efforts to revise parental perceptions
to achieve the desired results.
The courts are the only purveyors of divorce and custody
judgments, making branding interests less about successfully
competing against rivals for a share of the market. Instead, the
goal is to reduce “sales” by encouraging parents to settle their
disputes, thus decreasing the level of animosity associated with
custody litigation, and developing a positive perception of coparenting roles post-divorce.
III. Basic Branding Principles
Branding and marketing theories are typically the focus of
business development strategies.
Marketing professionals
promote the importance of branding when developing the image
projected to the public.29 When companies strive to enhance
their or their products’ public image, they often undergo a
rebranding. They may change their name, logo, or product
packaging, but rebranding goes beyond the visual symbols and
name associated with a business or its products. The rebranding
process involves building a new, positive perception about the
business or its products, often by recasting the core mission and
values of the company.30
27. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
29. See Heaton, supra note 5.
30. Bill Merrilees & Dale Miller, Principles of Corporate Rebranding, 42
EUR. J. MARKETING 537, 541 (2008).
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An Overview of Branding Concepts

A company’s brand is the impression that the consumer
develops about the quality of a product or service offered, as well
as the reputation and reliability of the company.31 A company’s
brand has been referred to as the “most valuable piece of real
estate in the world” because it occupies “a corner of someone’s
mind.”32 In order to be successful, a brand must promote some
benefit that the customer will receive. This is the “brand
promise,” often referred to as the “[v]alue [p]roposition” that
“create[s] an emotional connection based on the consumer’s
perception, feelings, and expectations.”33 Because 75% of
purchase decisions are emotionally-driven, creating this
emotional connection is what causes consumers to buy a product
or service and view the company positively.34
Branding, then, is the “process of building a positive
collection of perceptions about [a] business in [the] customers’
minds.”35 Once the value proposition the company seeks to offer
has been satisfactorily defined, the process of branding begins
with the aid of a marketing plan.36 Consistency in the image
projected is crucial, as is ensuring the consumer can relate to the
value proposition and the image being created.37
Selecting the company name is often a critical step in the
branding process. Because the name is one element of a
company’s brand that consumers use to evaluate the quality of
the product, “a good brand name can enhance the brand image,
perception, awareness, attributes, and benefits of the

31. Heaton, supra note 5.
32. JOHN HEGARTY, HEGARTY ON ADVERTISING: TURNING INTELLIGENCE
INTO MAGIC 555 (Thames & Hudson eds., Kindle ed. 2011).
33. JAY GRONLUND, BASICS OF BRANDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
MANAGERS 12 (2013).
34. Liz Papagni, 7 Fresh Ideas on How to Brand Your Business, BUSINESS
2 COMMUNITY (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.business2community.com/branding/7fresh-ideas-brand-business-0823233.
35. What Branding Is, FOR DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/howto/content/what-branding-is.html (emphasis added).
36. Heaton, supra note 5.
37. Papagni, supra note 34.
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product[.]”38 Psychological research suggests that the brand
name itself can trigger a positive emotional response to the
brand.39
Rebranding generally involves many of the same measures
as the original branding and is designed to create a new image
in order to enhance the company or product’s appeal to
consumers or, in some cases, distance the company from a prior
negative perception.40 Rebranding begins with the recognition
that modifications to the company or its products are required
and the identification of what needs to be adjusted.41 The
emphasis is on the new image, not on the fact that a
transformation is essential for a company to remain viable or to
further develop.42 Rebranding may be necessary if the brand
promise is no longer sustainable or if the business has evolved
so that the public image of the company must be realigned with
its new goals.43 If all that is being done is changing the name,
however, rebranding will generally not be successful.44 Success
occurs when the name change is combined with a new brand
promise, i.e. a new value proposition the company offers to the
consumer.45
Necessary steps in the rebranding process include
encouraging support from internal stakeholders, creating
continuity between the old brand and the new brand so the
consumer understands the transition, and taking the time

38. Mei-chun Cheung et al., Behavioral and Neural Investigation of Brand
Names, in PSYCHOLOGY OF BRANDING 111, 112 (W. Douglas Evans ed., 2013).
39. Id. at 126.
40. Laurent Muzellec & Mary Lambkin, Corporate Rebranding:
Destroying, Transferring or Creating Brand Equity?, 40 EUR. J. MARKETING
803, 805 (2006).
41. Giselle Abramovich, 5 Strategic Considerations for a Successful
Rebrand, CMO.COM (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.cmo.com/articles/2014/3/7/5_strategic_consider.html.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Kim Lachance Shandrow, The 8 Must-Follow Rules for Rebranding
Your
Company,
ENTREPRENEUR
(Sept.
10,
2014),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237296.
45. Abramovich, supra note 41. ePrize underwent a successful rebranding
when it changed its name to HelloWorld, after expanding its services beyond
connecting consumers with online sweepstakes, and offered new product lines.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2
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necessary to accomplish the shift in consumer perceptions.46
Although branding is externally focused on managing public
perception, internal constituencies are a vital component in the
rebranding process.47 Unless employees embrace the new value
proposition and promote it through their interactions with
consumers, the consistency of message will be lost.48 Similarly,
the new branding efforts must remain cognizant of the old brand
and purposefully strengthen the positive image that is desired.49
If the goal is to distance the company from negative branding,
efforts must be focused on demonstrating the departure from the
prior unsuccessful or outdated branding and how the revised
brand promise will benefit the consumer.50 If the new branding
is part of the evolution of the brand as the business grows, the
consumer must be led to believe that there is further
improvement or enhancement of an already desirable
commodity.51 Lastly, the time it takes to shift public perception
must be considered to ensure consumers understand the new
brand.52
One highly publicized “epic” rebranding failure involves
JCPenney.53 In a third attempt at rebranding in three years to
boost sagging sales, the retail merchant eliminated its
traditional sales and discount approach, familiar to consumers,
and introduced new, lower everyday pricing, calling it “Fair and
Square Pricing,” and added month-long special deals and “best
prices” days during the month.54 These efforts drove away the
company’s loyal customer base, causing sales to drop by almost
20%.55 The CEO acknowledged that the rebranding was
confusing for consumers who did not comprehend the new

46. Kristi Knight, 5 Tips on Rebranding from a Billion-Dollar Expert,
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/236942.
47. Id.
48. Id. See also Merrilees & Miller, supra note 30, at 541.
49. Knight, supra note 46.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Steve Olenski, JC Penney’s Epic Rebranding Fail, FORBES (June 15,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/06/15/jc-penneys-epicrebranding-fail/.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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nomenclature.56 The rebranding failed because there was a lack
of continuity between the old brand and the new, causing the
innovative pricing approach to surpass the customer’s
understanding of the benefits that may have been associated
with the changes.57
B.

Psychological Aspects of Branding

Because branding creates an emotional response by the
target audience, the psychology behind the effectiveness of
branding is a particularly favorite topic for exploration and
analysis. In his article Branding and the Psychology of
Consumer Behavior, Bobby Calder discussed the dual thinking
process that determines behavior; in one stage, referred to as
System 1, individuals react reflexively, usually without
conscious thought when confronted with specific cues, in a
process called “priming.”58 Calder described one particular
study that demonstrated the effects of priming: the study used
word associations, where individuals were given a list of words,
including ones associated with being elderly, and told to
organize them into sentences; these individuals subsequently
walked much slower after completing the task than another
group that had the identical words, minus those with the elderly
connotation.59 The individuals’ behavior was “primed” by being
exposed to the words acting as cues.
The other stage of thinking, referred to as System 2,
requires conscious thought and reasoning focused on resolving a
problem.60 A classic example would be a math problem solved in
a systematic way.61 This stage of thinking is used to resolve
conflicts as new information and prior associations are
processed.62 When this thought process becomes explicit as a
way of analyzing alternatives, those thoughts or associations
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Bobby J. Calder, Branding and the Psychology of Consumer Behavior,
in PSYCHOLOGY OF BRANDING 3, 6 (W. Douglas Evans ed., 2013).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2

10

2016

CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION

385

become beliefs.63 Calder notes, however, that invoking System
2 thinking requires the individual to be motivated and involved
in the process because of the effort required to scrutinize the
information received.64
Influencing these two stages of thinking is the goal of
branding. By appealing to both the automatic, reflexive
responses as well as beliefs created through orderly processing
of information, marketers can create an “attitude,” defined as
“evaluating something favorably or unfavorably.”65 Successful
branding strives to persuade the individual through effective
marketing that the product is favorable, creating a positive
attitude that eventually leads to habitual, reflexive use of the
product, even when exposed to other choices.66
C.

Using Branding to Influence Social Behavior

Branding principles are just now being viewed as effective
tools to modify social behavior. The theory is that behaviors
have similar characteristics to goods because they provide
choices to consumers and can be couched in terms of costs (risks)
and benefits.67
Although little sponsored research has been conducted,
rebranding campaigns to modify risky health behavior are
developing.68 Public health researchers have begun to treat
healthy behaviors, such as condom usage, smoking cessation,
and substance abuse avoidance as “products” to be marketed to
consumers.69 The goal has been to brand such behaviors with
positive images of a healthy, disease-free lifestyle, while at the
same time rebranding risky behavior, such as combining alcohol
and unprotected sex, with a negative image.70 Smoking,

63. Id.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id. at 12.
67. W. Douglas Evans, Branding Social and Health Behavior: An
Education and Research Agenda, in PSYCHOLOGY OF BRANDING 133, 134 (W.
Douglas Evans ed., 2013).
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id. at 136.
70. Id. at 139.
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commercially glamorized through marketing images such as the
rugged Marlboro man, is being rebranded successfully as a
health risk, while living a tobacco-free lifestyle is touted for its
health benefits that promote longevity.71
Branding campaigns targeting at-risk groups have the
highest likelihood of success if they can create new beliefs and
attitudes towards prevention and healthy alternatives.72 The
challenge, however, is in rebranding risky behavior because of
the positive images that instigate such behavior in the first
place.73 To be successful, the branding/rebranding campaign
must cause consumers to adopt a positive attitude towards the
benefits of a healthy lifestyle and develop a negative view of
risky behavior.74
IV. The Evolution of the “Custody” Brand
Unlike businesses that strive to differentiate themselves
from competitors through their brand in order to develop a
strong customer base, custody litigation does not involve the sale
of goods or services that can be obtained from a variety of
sources. Custody litigation is controlled by state governments
through legislative action and judicial implementation, and
judges and legislators are attempting to exit the business of
resolving custody disputes, not increase their market share.
Branding concepts, however, have application in the custody
litigation arena. The legislature and courts are, in fact, “selling”
the concept of avoiding litigation and ensuring better outcomes
for children through the statutory schemes adopted that drive
parties to make decisions concerning child placement and to do
so civilly, respectfully, and without animosity. Now that the goal
has been established, branding principles can be used to achieve
that goal.
Just like healthy social behavior is a product that can be
rebranded, custody litigation and parental behavior associated
with it is capable of being effectively rebranded. Rebranding is

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 139.
See id.
See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2

12

2016

CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION

387

necessary because the child custody standards continuum has
progressed from one of clearly defined rules to discretionary
factors designed to promote the best interests of the child.75 As
a result of this evolutionary process, the predictability
associated with custody determinations has devolved into a
system rife with uncertainty and conflict.76
A.

Shifts in Custody Standards

Throughout ancient history and until the early 19th century,
in the event of divorce, children were generally placed with the
patriarch of the family.77 More than 200 years ago, the custody
pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction with the
introduction of the “tender years” doctrine under English
common law, which resulted in maternal preference based on
women’s primary caretaking roles.78 The “tender years” doctrine
continued as the prevailing standard in the United States until
no-fault divorce concepts were introduced in the 1970s,
heralding changes in custody laws as a preference for joint legal
custody surfaced.79 The “best interest of the child” standard
75. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 233 (1975). See
generally Heather Crosby, The Irretrievable Breakdown of the Child:
Minnesota’s Move Toward Parenting Plans, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 489,
492-499 (2000) (discussing the evolution of principles guiding child custody
decision-making).
76. Critics of the current best interest of the child maintain that it creates
uncertainty in custody determinations, leading to more parental disputes. See
infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
77. See Ariel Ayanna, From Children’s Interests to Parental
Responsibility: Degendering Parenthood through Custodial Obligation, 19
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9-10 (2012).
78. Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-theChild Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s
“Approximation Rule”, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 83, 90 (2011).
79. See Ayanna, supra note 77, at 11-12; Jane C. Murphy, Rules,
Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in
Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1181 (1999). “Joint custody” can mean
“joint legal custody,” where parents share decision-making for major issues
affecting the child (e.g. religion, schooling, health, etc.); “joint physical
custody,” where parents share the custodial residence of the child on a fairly
equal basis; or a combination of both joint legal and physical custody. Maria
P. Cognetti & Nadya J. Chmil, Shared Parenting – Have We Really Closed the
GAP?: A Comment on AFCC’s Think Tank Report, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 181, 184
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began to gain popularity during this time as courts balanced
factors to determine which parent provided the optimal
environment in which to raise a child.80
Although the best interest of the child standard has been
favored for almost fifty years, its shortcomings and difficulties
in application have been well-documented.81 Without entirely
eviscerating the standard, various rebuttable presumptions
thought to advance the child’s best interest have been proposed
to ameliorate some of the uncertainty the standard brings.82
Presumptions have included the primary caretaker preference,83
the “approximation rule” endorsed by the American Law

(2014). The distinction is not always made clear in statutes or by legal
scholars.
80. Ayanna, supra note 77, at 12-13.
81. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests
of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-28 (1987) (arguing that the best interest
of the child standard is indeterminate, especially when judges are confronted
with equally fit parents; it is unjust because it ignores parental rights; it is
self-defeating because it encourages litigation, which is contrary to the child’s
best interest; and it can be sacrificed in favor of promoting a public policy
consideration); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in the all the
Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1523, 1540-43 (1994) (examining criticism of the best interest
standard). The best interest standard is problematic from an adjudicatory
perspective because it requires an assessment of individuals with a view
towards predicting future events, unlike typical adversarial litigation that
focuses on resolving disputes about past events. Jana B. Singer, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close Connection Between
Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Disputes, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 180 (2014).
82. Even these attempts to add certainty to the standards fall short. For
example, surveys suggest that even if the approximation rule was the operative
standard, litigants would dispute the amount of time each spent in caring for
the children. See Mary Jean Dolan & Daniel J. Hynan, Fighting Over Bedtime
Stories: An Empirical Study of the Risks of Valuing Quantity over Quality in
Child Custody Decisions, 38 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 45, 62-66 (2013-2014);
Warshak, supra note 78, at 126. See Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm
in Custody Law: Looking at Parents with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543,
552-63 (1996) (discussing a comprehensive comparison of the advantages and
disadvantages of the best interest of the child standard, joint custody option,
and primary caretaker preference).
83. Federle, supra note 81, at 1547.
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Institute,84 and joint physical custody.85 These presumptions
can be overcome, however, by a judicial finding that the
presumptive arrangement is not in the child’s best interest.86
With the adoption of the best interest standard there was
also a declaration that children have rights that are to be
protected.87 More than twenty-five years ago it was observed
that some reformers viewed the child’s interests or rights as
paramount, with the parents’ interests being subservient.88
Despite early reforms based on evidence that a child fares best
when both parents are involved in the child’s life, there was little
effort to impose duties upon a parent, primarily the noncustodial parent, to assume more of the child-rearing
responsibilities.89
Even scholars promoting joint custody
arrangements acknowledge that the lure of substantial
involvement in decision-making and time-sharing may not
“incentivize” a disinterested parent to participate in coparenting.90 This has started to change with the adoption of
statutes requiring “parenting plans” to be agreed to by the
parties, or absent agreement, ordered by the court. Whether
84. The “approximation rule” provides:
Unless otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . ,
the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each
parent approximates the proportion of time each parent
spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to
the parents' separation or, if the parents never lived together,
before the filing of the action[.]
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2002).
85. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-4-9.1(A) (West 2015).
86. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1)(a)- (g) (West 2015); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A), (B) (West 2015).
87. See generally Elrod, supra note 4.
88. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Drafters: The Struggle for Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1442 (1991). Additionally, the supremacy of
children’s rights over their parents has been promoted more recently. James
G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination and Children’s Custody: A New
Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ.
L. REV. 79, 79 (2012).
89. Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 1443.
90. Ayanna, supra note 77, at 48.
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mandating participation in the decision-making process defining
how the child will be raised will actually result in increased
participation by both parents post-divorce is debatable.91
Current legislation mandating shared custodial and
parental responsibility arrangements is often based on studies
suggesting that the child and parents benefit when an ongoing
relationship with both parents, characterized by frequent
contact and joint parental involvement in child-rearing, is
maintained.92 Such activities promote the child’s best interest
traumatic and engaged parents comply with support obligations
more regularly.93
Theoretically, this because post-divorce
adjustment is less should also reduce the animosity associated
with custody disputes by reducing the unpredictability of
litigation outcomes.94 Opponents to shared parenting note that
requiring frequent contact between the parents can exacerbate
litigation rather than decrease it, causing detriment to the
parents, as well as the child.95
It has been suggested that parents follow one of three coparenting models when required to engage in shared parenting:
“cooperative,” “parallel,” or “chronically conflicted.”96 Postdivorce, approximately 25% of parents cooperatively co-parent,
freely exchanging information about the child and successfully

91. Michael T. Flannery, Is “Bird Nesting” in the Best Interest of
Children?, 57 SMU L. REV. 295, 348 n.333 (2004).
92. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Indissoluble Nonresidential Parenthood:
Making it More than Semantics When Parents Share Parenting
Responsibilities, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 229, 236-38 (2012) (discussing advantages
and disadvantages associated with shared parenting including lack of stability
resulting from two homes, often with differing rules and expectations).
93. Id. at 236.
94. See Elrod, supra note 4, at 900 (suggesting that parents are more
likely to hire experts and engage in protracted litigation because the stakes
associated with custody disputes are so high and the outcomes are
unpredictable).
95. See Mabry, supra note 92, at 238-41 (discussing the negative impact
of forced shared parenting in high conflict divorces); Peter Jaffe, A Presumption
Against Shared Parenting for Family Court Litigants, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 187,
187-88 (2014) (arguing that shared parenting should not be the presumption
in high conflict cases, essentially those where the parents litigate issues
relating to custody, especially when accompanied by a history of domestic
violence, addictions, or mental health issues).
96. Matthew Sullivan, Feature, Coparenting: A Lifelong Partnership, 36
FAM. ADVOC. 18, 19 (2013).
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negotiating conflicts that arise; another 40% adopt a parallel coparenting style, interacting infrequently with little conflict,
while still adhering to shared parenting concepts as needed; and
the remaining 35% are chronically conflicted, exhibiting
“insufficient problem-solving and decision-making skills.”97
Children parented by the latter group tend to have the most
difficulty with post-divorce adjustment.98
B.

The New Value Proposition in Custody Litigation

The new terminology that has accompanied changes in
custody standards and the process through which custody
determinations are made represents an evolving trend to
eliminate references to “custody” and “visitation.” The terms
“parenting plans” and “parenting time” have gained popularity
among state legislators, suggesting a nationwide trend requiring
the adoption of “parenting plans”99 and the elimination of
traditional awards of “custody” and “visitation” to parents in an
effort to moderate the negative nomenclature thought to
contribute to the contentiousness of custody litigation. These
changes represent a shift in the “value proposition” that, in
many cases is accompanied by both semantic changes, as well as
more fundamental changes in custody standards and the process
of determining custody. Unlike shifts in value propositions
made by companies offering products and services, the changes
in the value proposition offered in custody litigation has not been
accompanied by intensive rebranding campaigns.
1. Parenting Plans
The first reference to a “parenting plan” in a divorce statute
dates back to at least 1987 with the adoption of the Washington
State Parenting Act requiring parties in a divorce action to
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In 1990, it was suggested that the adoption of a “parenting plan”
requirement in divorce statutes was a developing trend. Jane W. Ellis, Plans,
Protections, and Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody
Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 73
(1990).
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submit a proposed “parenting plan” to the court.100 The adoption
of the phrase to identify the terms governing the parent-child
relationship when parents do not reside together has undergone
a slow but steady progression.101 During the 1990s, at least nine
additional states amended statutes to adopt the new
nomenclature.102 Since 2000, the momentum has increased, so
that currently at least thirty states and the District of Columbia
include the term “parenting plan” in statutes or rules relating to
child placement following divorce.103
100. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 2016-29. Prior to Washington’s use of the
term, several other states required that parties submit a “plan” that included
details about the parents’ plans for a child’s care and upbringing, but the
phrase “parenting plan” was not used as a legal term of art. For a discussion
of the generic requirement to develop a custody “plan”. See Ellis, supra note
99, at 70.
101. During the 1989 Annual Meeting, the American Bar Association
House of Delegates approved a Model Joint Custody Statute that required a
“parenting plan” when the parents were to have joint custody or shared
parental responsibility. The statute did not gain wide acceptance. Ellis, supra
note 99, at 70.
102. Arizona, 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1402-04; California, 1993 Cal. Stat.
1624; Colorado, 1997 Colo. Sess. Laws 973; Missouri, 1998 Mo. Laws A/4/5 Box
184 Folder 128; Montana, 1997 Mont. Laws 1567; New Mexico, 1999 N.M.
Laws 1541; Ohio, 1990 Ohio Laws 112; Oregon, 1997 Or. Laws 1858;
Tennessee, 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1176.
103. The following jurisdictions include “parenting plans” in their
statutes or rules: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02 (2015); California,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2015); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124
(West 2015); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-30 (West 2015); District
of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (West 2015); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 61.13
(2015); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (West 2015); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 571-46.5 (West 2015); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1402(4) (West 2015);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2015); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 233211 (West 2014); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (2014);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (West 2015); Missouri, MO. ANN.
STAT. § 452.310 (West 2015); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234 (West
2015); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364 (West 2015); New Hampshire,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:1 (West 2015); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-4-9.1 (West 2015); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN., R. REG. MEDIATION
OF CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISP. 1, 12 (WEST 2015); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-30 (West 2015); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04
(West 2015); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West 2015); Oregon, OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.102 (West 2015); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5331 (West 2015); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A App.
A Guideline 5 (West 2015); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-402 (West
2015); Texas, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.603 (West 2015); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-10.8 (West 2015); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE Ann. § 26.09.184
(West 2015); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-205 (West 2015);
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Not all states require the adoption of a parenting plan,
however. At least six refer to a parenting plan only in passing
as a generic term, rather than as a formal plan assigning
parental rights and responsibility and delineating contact
between a parent and a child.104 Others require the parties to
submit a proposed plan in procedural rules, but not do not detail
what must be included in the proposal.105 Several, however,
mandate the filing of a parenting plan in each case and
enumerate those terms that must be included in the plan, such
as the schedule of parenting time between the parents and the
child; where the child will attend school; doctors and healthcare
facilities that will provide medical care for the child; religious
affiliation; holiday and summer parenting time schedules; the
method of communication between the parent and the child,
including electronic communications; child-care arrangements;
transportation; and methods to be used for resolving disputes
between the parents, such as mediation or the retention of
parenting coordinators.106
Others require the filing of a
parenting plan and offer suggestions of provisions to include, but
do not require their inclusion.107 Still other states give parents
and courts the option of developing a general or detailed

Wisconsin; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41 (West 2015).
104. See, e.g., California, CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2015) (stating the
court has wide discretion in choosing a parenting plan that is in the best
interest of the child); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56d (West
2015) (requiring the court to consider the impact a parent’s relocation would
have on an “existing parenting plan”); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1402(4)
(West 2015) (discussing the need for parenting plans in high conflict cases to
help “peacefully resolve child custody and visitation issues,” but does not
mention the adoption of a plan in IDAHO CODE § 32-717 and 717b dealing with
custody of children in divorce cases); Maine, ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653
(West 2015) (referring to a parenting plan only in connection with duties
assigned to a parenting coordinator); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
120.3 (West 2015) (referring to a parenting plan only in connection with duties
assigned to a parenting coordinator).
105. See, e.g., Connecticut, CONN. R. SUPER. CT. FAM. § 25-30 (requiring
parties in divorce cases to submit a detailed proposed order that includes a
parenting plan).
106. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. §
452.310 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-30 (West 2015); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5331(West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41 (West 2015).
107. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234 (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-914 (West 2015).
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parenting plan.108
2. “Custody” and “Visitation”
Over the past twenty years, eight states have completely
eliminated references to “custody” in statutory text governing
the parent-child relationship after divorce. Texas was the first
to adopt an alternative term in 1995;109 Maine,110 Montana,111
and Colorado112 followed suit in each of the subsequent three
years, respectively. After a seven year lull New Hampshire
extensively revised its statutes in 2005,113 followed by Florida in
2008,114 North Dakota in 2009,115 and Arizona in 2012.116 In lieu
of “custody,” most states adopted some version of “parental
rights and responsibilities.”117
Texas adopted the terms
“managing
conservatorship”
and
“possessory
108. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 107.102 (West 2015) (allowing for a
general parenting plan that lets parents set terms on an informal basis, but
which sets forth the “minimum amount of parenting time and access a
noncustodial parent is entitled to have,” or a detailed plan that may include
provisions relating to: “(a) Residential schedule; (b) Holiday, birthday and
vacation planning; (c) Weekends, including holidays, and school in-service days
preceding or following weekends; (d) Decision-making and responsibility; (e)
Information sharing and access; (f) Relocation of parents; (g) Telephone access;
(h) Transportation; and (i) Methods for resolving disputes”); see also HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 571-46.5 (West 2015).
109. 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 119, 123, 147-58 (using “managing
conservatorship,” “possessory conservatorship,” and “access” instead of
“custody” and “visitation”).
110. 1995 Me. Laws 1939 (substituting “parental responsibility” and
“parent-child contact” for “custody” and “visitation”).
111. 1997 Mont. Laws 1570, 1572-73 (substituting “parenting” and
“parental contact” for “custody” and “visitation,” respectively).
112. 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws 1376 (changing the term “custody” to “parental
responsibility” and “visitation” to “parenting time”).
113. 2005 N.H. Laws 622-26 (adopting a new chapter referring to
“parental rights and responsibilities” instead of parental “custody” and
“visitation”).
114. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
115. 2005 N.D. Laws 609, 611-12, 619 (referring to “parental rights and
responsibilities,” “parenting schedule,” and “residential responsibility” in lieu
of “custody” and “visitation”).
116. 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1816-18 (substituting “legal decision-making
and parenting time” for custody and defining “visitation” as time the child
spends with someone other than a parent).
117. See supra notes 110-116.
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conservatorship.”118
These states also eliminated references to “visitation” when
addressing a parent’s time with a child,119 although several still
use the term when providing for third-party rights of access to a
child or in situations involving inappropriate parental conduct
that results in limitations on contact with a child.120 In addition,
at least two states that still retain references to “custody” within
statutory text have eliminated “visitation” when addressing the
parent-child relationship.121 The most popular alternatives to
“visitation” include variations on “parenting” followed by “time,”
“schedule,” or “contact.”122
In some states, it was evident whether the revisions in
nomenclature were intended to substantively alter custody
standards or were merely semantic.123 The Colorado legislature
118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119. Although the statutory text has been amended in all eight
jurisdictions to eliminate the references to “custody” and “visitation” when
addressing parental rights and access, the terms still remain in the titles of
statutes in two states. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201, et seq. (West 2015) (titling
Title 40, Chapter 4 as “Termination of Marriage, Child Custody, Support,” with
Part 2 of that Chapter titled “Support, Custody, Visitation, and Related
Provisions”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.3 (West 2015) (permitting
investigations into parenting rights and responsibilities in contested cases in
a section titled Custody Investigations and Reports).
120. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401(7) (2015) (defining
“visitation” as “a schedule of time that occurs with a child by someone other
than a legal parent”); ME. REV.STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1653(6)-(7) (2015) (restricting
contact when there have been instances of domestic violence, conviction of
sexual offenses, or prior violations of an order of contact and access); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1801, et seq. (2015) (establishing grandparent visitation
rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228 (West 2015) (addressing custody and
visitation issues between a parent and a third-party); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
461-A:13 (2015) (providing grandparent visitation rights); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.014 (West 2015) (establishing visitation centers and visitation
exchange facilities for use during periods of possession and access in cases
requiring supervision or other monitoring).
121. In 1996, Michigan amended its Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.21, et seq. (West 2015) to substitute “parenting time”
in lieu of “visitation.” 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 937. Similarly, the Kansas
legislature eliminated “visitation” in favor of “parenting time” six years later.
2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 1577.
122. See supra notes 109-12, 115-16.
123. But see infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
uncertainty created in Florida as a result of the nomenclature changes); see
also Gary L. Crippen, Minnesota’s Alternatives to Primary Caretaker
Placements: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 677, 689-90
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made it clear that the nomenclature changes did not impact the
rights and responsibilities associated with traditional awards of
“custody” or “visitation”:
On and after July 1, 1993, the term “visitation”
has been changed to “parenting time.” It is not
the intent of the general assembly to modify or
change the meaning of the term “visitation” nor to
alter the legal rights of a parent with respect to
the child as a result of changing the term
“visitation” to “parenting time.”
On and after February 1, 1999, the term “custody”
and related terms such as “custodial” and
“custodian” have been changed to “parental
responsibilities”. It is not the intent of the general
assembly to modify or change the meaning of the
term “custody” nor to alter the legal rights of any
custodial parent with respect to the child as a
result of changing the term “custody” to “parental
responsibilities.”124
In contrast, in other states the new terminology reflected
extensive changes in how child placement and contact issues
were resolved as entirely new code sections were adopted.125
The states eliminating custody and visitation still use the
terms in connection with uniform laws adopted within the
jurisdiction and in implementing legislation enacted to give

(2001) (indicating there was uncertainty whether new authority was created
for judges to impose parenting plans absent parental agreement following
Minnesota’s adoption of statutes providing for plans that eliminated
traditional custodial labels).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-103(3)-(4) (West 2015).
125. See, e.g., New Hampshire, 2005 N.H. Laws 622-26 (adopting a new
chapter referring to “parental rights and responsibilities” instead of parental
“custody” and “visitation”); Texas, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 123-24 (developing a
new statutory system providing for “managing conservatorship,” “possessory
conservatorship,” and “access” instead of “custody” and “visitation”). See infra
Section IV.B.3 for a detailed discussion of the extent of amendments to the
Florida Statutes.
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effect to federal statutes.126 To ensure that orders not containing
the term “custody” are properly interpreted for purposes of
enforcement under statutes such as the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, some states have adopted provisions that make
clear the legislative intent.127 The language used in such
statutes is similar to that adopted by New Hampshire:
[a]ny provision of law that refers to the “custody”
of minor children shall mean the allocation of
parental rights and responsibilities as provided in
this chapter. Any provision of law which refers to
a “custodial parent” shall mean a parent with 50
percent or more of the residential responsibility
and any reference to a non-custodial parent shall
mean a parent with less than 50 percent of the
residential responsibility.128
In light of this growing trend to eliminate “custody” and
“visitation,” and in some cases revise custody standards and the
procedure for making custody determinations, an analysis of
Florida’s experience gives some guidance on how branding
principles could be applied to shift social behavior in the custody
litigation arena as it has been used in issues involving public
health concerns. The revisions to Florida’s statutes are in many
ways typical of amendments adopted in other states and provide
a reasonable framework to discuss the utility of branding
principles in the context of custody litigation.
3. Florida’s Statutory Revisions
The revisions to the Florida Statutes illustrate how the
value proposition associated with custody litigation has
undergone major shifts. As a result, it presents a useful model
126. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.3-01, et seq. (West 2015) (adopting
the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-14.1-01, et seq. (West 2015) (adopting the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act).
127. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-33 (West 2015).
128. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:20 (West 2015).
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to discuss how branding principles could be used to effectuate
changes in parents’ behavior during the litigation of their
disputes. A review of the amendments that went into effect on
October 1, 2008, is a helpful starting point.129
The word “custody” was not part of Florida’s original divorce
statutes, enacted in 1828.130 Since major revisions in 1971 to the
Florida Statutes governing divorce actions,131 one thing
remained constant – divorcing parties were required to agree to,
or the court would adjudicate “custody” and “visitation” rights.132
Presumably, because the terms “custody” and “visitation” were
intended to have their everyday plain meaning, they were not
defined in divorce statutes, unlike the term “primary residential
parent,” introduced and defined in the 1982 legislation, which
marked the first major revision in custody standards.133 In an
attempt to reduce animosity associated with custody litigation,
the term “primary residential parent” was adopted in the Shared
Parental Responsibility Act in 1982 as a more neutral term to
avoid references to the “care, custody, and control” of a child by
parents.134
Use of “primary residential parent” avoided
references to custody and was defined as “the parent with whom
the child maintains his or her primary residence.”135 Still, the
term “custody” remained in the statute governing child
placement decisions following divorce.136
The next major revisions occurred in 2008 when the word
“custody” was completely eliminated from the divorce statutes,
as were the phrases “primary residential parent” and “visitation
rights”137 in divorce138 actions. The unstated (yet clear) goal of
129. For ease of references, these statutory revisions are referred to as the
“2008 amendments” throughout this article.
130. 1828 Fla. Laws 12.
131. 1971 Fla. Laws 1319 et seq.
132. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2007).
133. Renee Goldenberg, Practical Aspects of Parenting Conflicts:
Preparing Parents for Litigation, 72 FLA. B.J. 54, 58 (1998).
134. Id. at 54.
135. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(3) (2007).
136. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982).
137. See generally 2008 Fla. Laws 788-848.
138. Although the terminology in the Florida Statutes was changed from
“divorce” to “dissolution of marriage,” in 1971, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, never, in
twenty-five years of private practice, did clients tell this author that they
wanted their marriage dissolved; instead, they wanted a divorce. The fact that
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the 2008 legislative revisions of the terminology associated with
custody proceedings in Florida139 was the same goal that had
previously resulted in the 1982 amendments – to reduce the
animosity prevalent in custody litigation between parents
because of the deleterious effect parent behavior has on a
child.140 When the word “custody” was stricken from the title of
Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes, which governs divorce
cases,141 “time-sharing” was inserted in its place.142 This
modification at the outset of the chapter foreshadows the
significant changes promulgated by the 2008 Florida legislature.
The different terminology and accompanying new definitions are
coupled with a requirement imposed on both the parents and the
court that final judgments in divorce actions involving a minor
child must include a detailed “parenting plan” developed
through agreement by the parents, or, if necessary, imposed by
the judge.143
a. Parenting Plans
The term “parenting plan” first appeared in connection with
the general public has not adopted the “new” nomenclature as part of everyday
vernacular after almost 45 years have passed since the statutory change,
suggests that it is questionable whether changes in statutory terminology in
connection with custody cases will become part of everyday usage. For
consistency, “divorce” is used throughout this article.
139. Ironically, the synopsis of the matters addressed in the 2008
statutory revisions starts with “[a]n act relating to child custody . . . .” and then
proceeds to eliminate the word “custody” from the Florida Statutes addressing
the parent/child relationship. 2008 Fla. Laws 788.
140. Since 1971, FLA. STAT. § 61.001(2)(c) (2015) has stated: “[Chapter
61’s] purposes are: . . . To mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their
children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage.” See also
Michael P. Sampson, Home Court Advantage: Jurisdictional Disputes in TimeSharing Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN FLORIDA: LEADING LAWYERS
ON EDUCATING CLIENTS, HANDLING DIVORCE CASES, AND NAVIGATING EMERGING
ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW 83 (2011).
141. Although the Chapter refers to dissolution of marriage, § 61.13 sets
forth issues relating to child placement and contact and access between parties
and their children that are applicable in paternity actions, see, e.g., Stepp v.
Stepp, 520 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), as well as actions seeking an
“injunction for protection against domestic violence.” FLA. STAT. § 741.30(3)(b)
(2015).
142. 2008 Fla. Laws 789-90.
143. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13) (2008); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(a)-(b) (2015).
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Florida custody litigation in a 2001 report of the Florida Family
Court Steering Committee submitted to the Florida Supreme
Court.144 The term was not defined and was used only once in
the thirty-five page report in connection with a recommendation
that case management commence with careful screening of the
litigants to determine if there is a history of domestic violence,
if referral to social service agencies is required, and if there is a
“need to address emotional issues before the parties are expected
to negotiate appropriate parenting plans[.]”145 Following that
report and prior to the 2008 statutory revisions, the phrase
appeared in only six appellate cases.146 In none of those
opinions, however, did an appellate court utilize the term in its
analysis. Rather, the phrase appeared in four appellate opinions
only as direct quotations from the trial court’s order or final
judgment,147 in one case as direct quotations from the trial
court’s order and a statement of the arguments raised by one of
the parties,148 and in one case as part of the analysis of an out144. See In re Report of the Fam. Ct. Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d 518 (Fla.
2001).
145. Id. at 540.
146. See Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So. 2d 52, 58-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Briscoe v. Briscoe, 927 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006);
Fredman v. Fredman, 917 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); RaoNagineni v. Rao, 895 So. 2d 1160, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Wade v.
Hirschman, 872 So. 2d 952, 954-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by,
Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 941 (Fla. 2005) (the Florida Supreme
Court did not use the term in its opinion, but referred to a “parenting
coordinator plan”); Feger v. Feger, 850 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003). In addition, the terminology is found in the West syllabus and
headnotes in Watt v. Watt, 966 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), but does
not appear in the opinion itself. The use of the terminology by West may be
attributed to the growing trend among other states to use the phrase.
147. Briscoe, 927 So. 2d at 113 (“[t]he circuit court denied the
supplemental petition, ruling in relevant part that . . . ‘the co-parenting split
parenting plan . . . is not unworkable and doomed to failure’”); Fredman, 917
So. 2d at 1041 (“[a]dditionally, the trial court found that ‘the Mother's move to
Texas would certainly impede the parties [sic] ability to implement the
parenting plan designed in the Marital Settlement Agreement’”); RaoNagineni, 895 So. 2d at 1160 (“[t]he court then rendered a ‘Final Judgment of
Equitable Distribution, Parenting Plan and Child Support’”); Feger, 850 So. 2d
at 614 (“the [trial] court stated that it ‘continues to believe and therefore finds
that it did create a parenting plan’”).
148. In Wade, 872 So. 2d at 954-55, appellant argued that appellee’s
failure to comply with the parenting plan was not a substantial change in
circumstances, and the appellate court quoted from the trial court’s order:
“[f]ailure to comply with the parenting plan may be considered contempt and
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of-state appellate decision where that state uses the phrase
“parenting plan” in its custody statutes.149 The undefined term
also appeared in pre-2008 Administrative Orders issued by at
least two Florida circuit court chief judges addressing the
appointment of parenting coordinators.150
The first definition of the term “parenting plan” appeared in
the 2008 amendments to Chapter 61:
“Parenting plan” means a document created to
govern the relationship between the parents
relating to decisions that must be made regarding
the minor child and must contain a time-sharing
schedule for the parents and child. The issues
concerning the minor child may include, but are
not limited to, the child’s education, health care,
and physical, social, and emotional well-being. In
creating the plan, all circumstances between the
parents, including their historic relationship,
domestic violence, and other factors must be taken
into consideration.151
The definition is broad and it appears that the typical final
judgment or marital settlement agreement including general
language that the parties will have shared parental

could affect the parties' visitation and/or custody rights.”
149. In Fredman, 960 So. 2d at 57-59, “parenting plan” was used to
discuss a New Mexico case, Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 306 (N.M.
1991), which used the phrase found in New Mexico’s custody statutes.
150. See, e.g., In Re: Amending Administrative Order Re Parenting
Coordination in Family Law Cases, No. 06-03 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007),
http://www.jud11.flcourts.org/documents/Administrative_Orders/1-0603%20A1Amend%20Parenting%20Coordination%20Family%20%20Law%20Cases.pdf;
In Re: Domestic Relations—Parenting Coordinators in High Conflict Family
Law
Cases,
No.
05-39
(Fla.
Cir.
Ct.
July
28,
2005),
http://flcourts18.org/PDF/05-39.pdf.
151. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13) (2008). Subsequent amendments to the
definition consisted of punctuation, stylistic, and non-substantive changes that
also resulted in a renumbering of the statute. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(14) (2013).
The definition also requires that the parents develop and agree to the plan,
which must be approved by the court to be effective; if the parents are unable
to agree, then the court must establish the plan. Id.
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responsibility152 might be sufficient to qualify as a parenting
plan. Additional 2008 legislative revisions indicate that this is
not the case. An entirely new section requires that:
Any parenting plan approved by the court must,
at minimum, describe in adequate detail how the
parents will share and be responsible for the daily
tasks associated with the upbringing of the child,
the time-sharing schedule arrangements that
specify the time that the minor child will spend
with each parent, a designation of who will be
responsible for any and all forms of health care,
school-related matters, other activities, and the
methods and technologies that the parents will
use to communicate with the child.153
Although the definition of a parenting plan indicates that
certain issues, such as education and health care may be
addressed, this new section mandates that the parenting plan
must identify which parent will be the decision-maker
concerning many issues. The presumption that parents will
have shared parental responsibility of their minor children
subsequent to their divorce remains unchanged.154 By requiring
that there be a designation of who has responsibility for
decisions relating to health care, undefined “school-related

152. The definition for “shared parental responsibility” adopted in 1982
and which remains unchanged by the new legislation, states that “‘[s]hared
parental responsibility’ means a court-ordered relationship in which both
parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their
child and in which both parents confer with each other so that major decisions
affecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly.” FLA. STAT. §
61.046(16) (2007).
153. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (2008) (emphasis added). The 2008 version
of the statute did not require that an address be designated for purposes of
school boundary determinations. Id. Without the designation of a primary
residential parent and primary residence of the child, corrective legislation was
required in 2009 to determine school attendance. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2)(b)
(2009) (stating that a parenting plan should “includ[e] the address to be used
for school-boundary determination and registration”).
154. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (2015) (reflecting that the court is required
to order shared parental responsibility, unless there is evidence that doing so
would be detrimental to the best interests of the minor child).
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matters,”155 and undefined “other activities,” the language of the
new statutory section intimates that one party should have sole
parental responsibility,156 at least with respect to those issues
which must be included in the parenting plan.
While the court and the parties were always statutorily
permitted to designate one party with ultimate decision-making
authority over specific issues related to the child’s welfare,
notwithstanding the award of shared parental responsibility,157
the requirement that a designation be made suggests a
preference that one party be given such ultimate authority.
Allowing one parent to make decisions affecting the child on
certain issues may avoid post-divorce disagreements and reduce
the need for judicial intervention when the parents cannot agree,
but it runs afoul of the stated public policy “to encourage parents
to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of
childrearing.”158 Traditionally, the courts have found that
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the presumption
favoring shared parental responsibility with reference to all
child welfare related issues was rebutted, absent a showing of
great detriment to the child.159
The requirement that parents of young children decide at
155. Whether the legislature intended there to be a difference between
“education” issues, enumerated in the definitional statute, and “school-related
matters,” referred to in the section detailing the mandatory provisions that
must be included in a parenting plan is not clear. Under strict statutory
construction, the different word choices indicate that different meanings were
intended. It could be argued that “education” is a broad term that refers to
decisions affecting school selection, while “school-related matters” relate to
decisions required on a daily basis, such as field trip attendance and extracurricular activities. Trial courts will be required to determine what the
“school-related matters” required to be addressed in the parenting plan
actually include. See, e.g., Fazzaro v. Fazzaro, 110 So. 3d 49, 50-52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2013).
156. The definition of “sole parental responsibility” as a “court-ordered
relationship in which one parent makes decisions regarding the minor child”
remains unchanged by the 2008 statutory revisions. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(17)
(2007).
157. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a) (2007); see, e.g., Kasdorf v. Kasdorf, 931
So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Cruz v. Domenech, 905 So. 2d 938,
940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299, 1300
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
158. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (2007).
159. See, e.g., Maslow v. Edwards, 886 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004).
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the time of their divorce who will be responsible for certain childrelated obligations during the minority of the child may be
unrealistic and may result in exacerbated future litigation,
rather than a reduction in recidivistic enforcement and
modification actions.160 The requirement that the parenting
plan include “adequate detail[s]” about “how the parents will
share and be responsible for the daily tasks associated with the
upbringing of the child” invites one party (or the court) to micromanage the childrearing decisions of the other party.161 What
constitutes “adequate details” for one trial court judge, may not
suffice for another. Even more problematic, deviations from the
detailed methodology for handling daily tasks associated with
child-rearing may actually cause an increase in enforcement
actions, rather than the anticipated decrease. Traditionally, the
day-to-day tasks for the child have been the responsibility of the
parent who has the child at any given moment.162 Whether the
judiciary should be involved in determining the daily parenting
decisions of divorcing parents is not clear.
b. Time-Sharing Schedules
In place of “custody” and “visitation” schedules, parents are
required to fashion a “time-sharing schedule.” A definition is
included in the statute: “Time-sharing schedule” means a
timetable that must be included in the parenting plan that
specifies the time, including overnights and holidays, that a
minor child will spend with each parent.163
The term “time-sharing” is not a new term in Florida divorce
actions;164 however, this is the first time it was statutorily
defined. In addition, although time-sharing may have been used
in the past, it has typically been used as a substitute for, or in
conjunction with, the word “visitation” consistent with the

160. See Mabry, supra note 92.
161. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (2008).
162. See generally Kuharcik v. Kuharcik, 629 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
163. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(22) (2008).
164. “Time-sharing” first appeared in the Florida Supreme Court
approved Family Court forms in 1998. In re Amendments to the Florida
Family Law Rules, 713 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1998).
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parental relocation statutes165 or when visitation is awarded to
the non-custodial parent.166
c. Factors to Be Considered in Developing a Parenting
Plan that Includes a Time-Sharing Schedule
The best interest of the minor child still controls the
determination of how parental responsibilities will be divided
between the parents and the time that each parent will spend
with the minor child.167 Previously, Florida courts were required
to evaluate twelve specific factors to determine parental
responsibility, primary residence, and visitation, plus were
given the typical discretion to include any additional factors the
court deemed relevant.168 The 2008 amendments eliminated
several factors,169 but added others, bringing the total number of
specified factors to nineteen (plus the catch-all anything else
deemed relevant) “affecting the welfare and interests of the
165. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7)(c) (2007).
166. Fla. Fam. L. Forms 12.905(a); Fla. Fam. L. Forms 12.993(a).
167. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2008).
168. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007).
169. The factors that have been eliminated from FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007) are:
(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent
and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parents and the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care
recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu
of medical care, and other material needs.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home.
(j) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent.
(k) Evidence that any party has knowingly provided false
information to the court regarding a domestic violence
proceeding pursuant to s. 741.30.
(l) Evidence of domestic violence or child abuse.
(m) Any other fact considered by the court to be relevant.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a)-(c), (e), (j)-(m) (2007).
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[particular] child, [and the circumstances of that family]” that
must be considered to determine the best interests of the child
when formulating a parenting plan and time-sharing
schedule.170 The spirit and intent of the factors that were
170. The twenty factors listed under FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2008) are:
(a) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent
to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parentchild relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to
be reasonable when changes are required.
(b) The anticipated division of parental responsibilities after
the litigation, including the extent to which parental
responsibilities will be delegated to third parties.
(c) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent
to determine, consider, and act upon the needs of the child as
opposed to the needs or desires of the parent.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity.
(e) The geographic viability of the parenting plan, with
special attention paid to the needs of school-age children and
the amount of time to be spent traveling to effectuate the
parenting plan. This factor does not create a presumption for
or against relocation of either parent with a child.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and
experience to express a preference.
(j) The demonstrated knowledge, capacity, and disposition of
each parent to be informed of the circumstances of the minor
child, including, but not limited to, the child's friends,
teachers, medical care providers, daily activities, and favorite
things.
(k) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent
to provide a consistent routine for the child, such as
discipline, and daily schedules for homework, meals, and
bedtime.
(l) The demonstrated capacity of each parent to communicate
with and keep the other parent informed of issues and
activities regarding the minor child, and the willingness of
each parent to adopt a unified front on all major issues when
dealing with the child.
(m) Evidence of domestic violence, sexual violence, child
abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect, regardless of
whether a prior or pending action relating to those issues has
been brought.
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eliminated, however, were incorporated in the revised listing of
factors to be considered.171
(n) Evidence that either parent has knowingly provided false
information to the court regarding any prior or pending
action regarding domestic violence, sexual violence, child
abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect.
(o) The particular parenting tasks customarily performed by
each parent and the division of parental responsibilities
before the institution of litigation and during the pending
litigation, including the extent to which parenting
responsibilities were undertaken by third parties.
(p) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent
to participate and be involved in the child's school and
extracurricular activities.
(q) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent
to maintain an environment for the child which is free from
substance abuse.
(r) The capacity and disposition of each parent to protect the
child from the ongoing litigation as demonstrated by not
discussing the litigation with the child, not sharing
documents or electronic media related to the litigation with
the child, and refraining from disparaging comments about
the other parent to the child.
(s) The developmental stages and needs of the child and the
demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to meet
the child's developmental needs.
(t) Any other factor that is relevant to the determination of a
specific parenting plan, including the time-sharing schedule.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a)-(t) (2008).
171. In many ways, the prior list of thirteen factors allowed more
discretion to the trial judge because the factors were much more holistic and
did not specify behaviors. The revised factors are detailed and may express
value judgments about what “good” parenting practices are. For example,
under the new list of factors, the court must consider which parent is more
familiar with the child’s “favorite things.” FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(j) (2008). Pity
the court that must determine the relative merit of the parents when one
knows which morning cartoons the child prefers, but the other parent knows
which major league pitcher is the child’s favorite athlete. Similarly, the court
is required to hear evidence about which parent has a “consistent routine . . .
and daily schedules for homework, meals, and bedtime.” FLA. STAT. §
61.13(3)(k) (2008). The unstated preference here is that the parent who is more
regimented in adhering to a schedule may have an advantage. Unfortunately,
the free-spirited, less schedule-driven parent is apparently viewed less
favorably, notwithstanding that such parental traits are not necessarily
deemed detrimental to a child. That judicial decisions concerning custody and
child placement are influenced by a judge’s personal biases and values has
been noted in criticism of the best interest of the child standard. Daniel A.
Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise, and Experts in the
Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 843,
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The 2008 amendments represent not only nomenclature
changes, but also revisions in the standards used to evaluate
custody cases, representing a new value proposition for custody
litigation. Those changes include, among other provisions, the
requirement that parties develop an agreed-upon parenting
plan, absent which the court makes the determination, a
requirement that the plan indicate who has ultimate decisionmaking rights over certain issues affecting the child, a new
obligation on both parties to actively participate in childrearing,
and expanded factors for the court to consider in ordering a
parenting plan. With this new value proposition placing the
onus on parents to assume more responsibility for resolving
parenting issues, a rebranding of custody litigation is necessary
for the transition to succeed and for the goal of reduced acrimony
to be achieved.
V.
A.

The Florida Experience in Rebranding Custody Litigation
Reactions by Judges, Attorneys, and Litigants

Now that seven years have passed since the 2008
amendments were adopted, a body of case law is developing that
offers some perspective on whether the changes are achieving
the goals of reduced acrimony during litigation and a shift in
parents’ perspective of their roles post-divorce. Following the
October 1, 2008, effective date of the amendments, many courts
struggled with adapting to the new nomenclature. The effect of
the new value proposition was not clear to judges and lawyers,
those who were charged with implementing the new brand
promise of a less acrimonious divorce. Several early court
decisions referred to the terms “parenting plan” and “timesharing” as replacing “custody” and “visitation,”172 but
859-60 (2000).
172. LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 576 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(citation omitted) (“In October 2008, the Florida Legislature amended Chapter
61, Florida Statutes, and changed the term ‘custody’ to ‘parental responsibility’
and ‘visitation’ to ‘timesharing.’”); Mudafort v. Lee, 62 So. 3d 1196, 1197 n.1
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that “the concept of ‘custody’ was replaced
with ‘time-sharing’”); Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493, 501 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (acknowledging that while the 2008 amendments eliminated
references “to ‘custody,’ ‘primary residence,’ ‘primary residential parent,’ and
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questioned the import of the statutory changes173 and the
applicability of prior case law, creating unresolved conflicts
between the appellate courts.174
Some courts, however,
appeared to be uncertain whether the new terms were actual
replacements and which words they replaced.175 This suggests
a rebranding failure from the inception.
Because “custody,” “visitation,” and the “primary residential

‘visitation’ in favor of a ‘parenting plan’ that includes ‘time sharing’” courts
must still consider the best interests of the child); Lombard v. Lombard, 997
So. 2d 1188, 1189 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted) (“We
recognize that, effective October 1, 2008, [the statutory amendments], replaced
the terms ‘custody’ and ‘visitation’ with the concept of a ‘parenting plan’ that
includes ‘time-sharing.’”).
173. In the dissenting opinion in Corey v. Corey, a case considering the
trial court’s pre-2008 order on rotating custody, Senior Judge Alan Schwartz
mussed “[w]hile we need not consider the broad revision of the statutory family
. . . which took effect on October 1, 2008, . . . I wonder whether the changes in
form and nomenclature, with which it is mostly concerned, significantly affect
the previously established substantive law.” Corey v. Corey, 29 So. 3d 315, 321
n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
174. See Lombard, 997 So. 2d at 1189 n.1 (finding that the 2008
amendments require that the parenting plan and time-sharing schedule be
determined after consideration of the child’s best interests and consequently
“is consistent with prior law”). Cf. Mudafort, 62 So. 3d at1197 n.1 (finding that
the 2008 amendments eliminated the presumption against rotating custody,
which the court found had been replaced by “equal time-sharing,” and that the
factors under Mancuso v. Mancuso, 789 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
that were to be considered to determine if the presumption had been overcome,
were no longer relevant); Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68 So.3d 310, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (acknowledging that the presumption against rotating custody no
longer existed, but finding that the Mancuso factors were still applicable to
determine whether an equal time-sharing plan was in a child’s best interests).
175. “It appears that the trial court has confused the terms ‘visitation’ and
‘time-sharing,’ using visitation to mean what section 61.13(2)(c), Florida
Statutes (2010), refers to as time-sharing and using the term ‘majority timesharing’ when referring to the determination of which party will be the child’s
primary residential parent.” Mayo v. Mayo, 87 So. 3d 820, 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012). In a footnote, the court went on to state, “[a] 2008 amendment to
the statute removed the word ‘visitation’ from chapter 61 and replaced it in
some instances with the term ‘parenting plan’ and in other places, such as
section 61.13(2)(c), with the term ‘time-sharing.’” Id. at n.1. (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Bainbridge v. Pratt, the court stated that the 2008 amendments
“abolished the concept of custody and replaced it with ‘parenting plans’ and
‘time-sharing[.]’” Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68 So. 3d 310, 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011). In addressing whether a rotating schedule was in the child’s best
interest under the new statute, the court went on to refer to the schedule as
“rotating custody,” a “rotating parenting plan,” and a “rotating time-sharing
plan.” Id. at 313-14.
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parent” designation were eliminated prospectively, most
appellate cases well into 2012176 applied prior versions of the
statute and still used the eliminated terms when reviewing trial
court orders because the cases were filed before the effective date
of the statutory amendments.177 Many courts, both at the trial
and appellate levels, however, attempted to incorporate the
concepts of a parenting plan and time-sharing into the
judgments entered and opinions issued, some even pre-dating
the effective date of the amendments,178 while still applying the
prior statute, resulting in “custody,” “visitation,” “parenting
plan,” “time-sharing,” and “primary residential parent” being
muddled into the same case.179
In actions filed subsequent to the 2008 amendments,
references to the prior designations, even when applying the new
statutory
scheme,
continued
to
plague
litigants,180
176. Pursuant to directives from the Florida Supreme Court, contested
family law cases should ideally be resolved at the trial court level within 6
months of filing. That appellate courts were still applying the prior statute in
cases well into 2011 evidences that fact that litigation over child placement
issues are not often resolved in the preferred time period. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN.
2.250(a)(1)(C).
177. See, e.g., Knowles v. Knowles, 79 So. 3d 870, 871 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012) (acknowledging that “the pre-2008 terminology” must be used in
reviewing “custody” orders in cases filed before the effective date of the
amendments).
178. See, e.g., J.L.B. v. S.J.B., 135 So. 3d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(reviewing an order modifying the parenting plan contained in a September
2008 final judgment, predating the October 1, 2008, effective date for the
amendments); Justice v. Justice, 80 So. 3d 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(reversing and remanding an internally inconsistent final judgment in an
action filed in 2007 that went to final hearing in 2009 and awarded the mother
the “majority of timesharing” and the father “visitation” consistent with a
temporary relief order entered pre-2008 that designated the mother the
“primary residential parent”).
179. See infra notes 178-193 and accompanying text.
180. In Sparks v. Sparks, an action filed post-2008, two pro se litigants
entered into a marital settlement agreement that provided for both “joint
custody” and a “schedule of rotating physical custody.” Sparks v. Sparks, 75
So. 3d 861, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). In reversing the final judgment that
incorporated the agreement for failure to consider the father’s claim that the
agreement was contrary to the best interests of the child, the appellate court
repeatedly referred to custody and visitation without mentioning “timesharing,” although the action was filed after the effective date of the
amendments and the court cited the 2010 version of the statute. Id. at 862.
Similarly, in Neuman v. Harper, a post-2008 paternity action, the mother
challenged a final judgment awarding the father majority time-sharing,
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practitioners,181 and judges.182 When dealing with pro se
litigants, trial courts were inclined to resort to the traditional
vernacular and eschewed the statutory nomenclature changes
because the parents themselves continued to use the terms
“custody” and “visitation.”183 In addition, courts found it difficult
claiming that the father did not seek designation as the primary residential
parent in his petition and the judgment did not state “how it is in the best
interest of the child to designate a Primary Residential Parent.” Neuman v.
Harper, 106 So. 3d 974, 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). In finding the trial court
did not abuse its discretion, the court stated, “[w]hile the final judgment does
not specifically designate a ‘primary residential parent,’ the time-sharing
schedule placed [the minor child] with the father in the role of what
traditionally would have been considered the primary residential parent.” Id.
See also Waybright v. Johnson-Smith, 115 So. 3d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
181. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 100 So. 3d 763, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012) (where mother, through counsel, filed a “Motion to Maintain
Primary Residential Custodianship”). Practitioners acknowledge that the
term “custody” is still popularly used, despite the statutory changes. Bruce A.
Christensen, Divorce Case Challenges and Issues in Florida, in STRATEGIES FOR
FAMILY LAW IN FLORIDA: LEADING LAWYERS ON EDUCATING CLIENTS, HANDLING
DIVORCE CASES, AND NAVIGATING EMERGING ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW 7 (2011).
182. See Kelley v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding
that an order in a case filed after 2008 while initially appearing to grant liberal
time-sharing, in fact, severely limits the former husband’s visitation)
(emphasis added); Campbell, 100 So. 3d 763 (reversing, on jurisdictional
grounds, an order vacating an order that designated the former husband the
“primary residential parent” after the father sought modification of the 2009
final judgment incorporating a parenting plan that provided the child would
reside with the mother and would have timesharing with the child on
alternating weekends). At least one court while ordering a time-sharing
schedule, failed to comply with the obligation to establish a broader parenting
plan incorporating the schedule consistent with the statutory mandate.
Munroe v. Olibrice, 83 So. 3d 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). See also Pope v.
Langowski, 115 So. 3d 1076, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that the
trial court entered a final judgment “granting primary physical custody to the
mother and allowing the father more liberal visitation over time,” but
remanding “for the court to correct . . . two typographical errors in the
parenting plan”); Fernandez v. Wright, 111 So. 3d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
(referring to both time-sharing and custody); Shiba v. Gabay, 120 So. 3d 80
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (referring to custody, timesharing, and visitation);
Vazquez v. Vazquez-Robelledo, 150 So. 3d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (using
both “time-sharing” and “visitation”).
183. In Waybright v. Johnson-Smith, a 2012 paternity action involving
pro se parties, the father sought “sole physical custody” of the child with
“supervised visitation” by the mother. Waybright v. Johnson-Smith, 115 So.
3d 445, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). The appellate court reversed the trial
court’s order awarding “rotating custody” because evidence of domestic
violence was improperly excluded, finding that violence is probative conduct in
a “child custody case” and there was insufficient evidence under the factors in
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to avoid references to “custody” and “visitation” when discussing
legal principles developed in prior case law that remain
applicable under the amended statute.184
Other courts
continued to rely on model time-sharing and parenting plans
adopted by their circuits, amended only to reflect cursory
changes to nomenclature, while also referring to “visitation” and
“primary residential parent designations.”185 These struggles
demonstrate that the consumers of the new custody litigation
paradigm, as well as those executing the process designed to
promote the new value proposition, did not develop the favorable
perception that would allow them to reflexively apply the new
standards. The positive “attitude” that is seen in successful
the amended statute to “support the weekly rotating custody schedule”
established by the court. Id. at 447. Although the action was filed after 2008,
the appellate court never used the terms “parenting plan” or time-sharing.”
See also Sparks, 75 So. 3d at 861; Neuman, 106 So. 3d at 976.
184. In A.L.G. v. J.F.D., a post-2008 paternity action, the court addressed
issues relating to time-sharing, but cited to pre-2008 case law as support for
its statement specific findings of fact are not necessary to support a “custody
decision.” A.L.G. v. J.F.D., 85 So. 3d 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). See also
AbouElSeoud v. ElBadrawi, 133 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (using
“custody” when addressing the appellate court’s jurisdiction to hear temporary
orders under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure).
185. For example, Florida’s 15th Circuit Court’s website has proposed
timesharing schedules that incorporate the new statutory language in the title,
but still refer to “visitation,” “primary residential parent,” and “secondary
residential parent.” Model Parental Timesharing Schedule (In-State Where the
Parents Reside More than 45 Miles Apart), 15th JUDICIAL COURT OF FLORIDA
(last
visited
Jan.
25,
2016),
http://www.palmbeachbar.org/Family/Model%20Parental%20Time%20Sharin
g%20Schedule%20Colin%20_In-state%20less%20than%2045_.pdf;
Model
Parental Time-Sharing Schedule (Out-of-State), 15th JUDICIAL COURT OF
FLORIDA (last visited Jan. 25, 2016), https://15thcircuit.co.palmbeach.fl.us/documents/10179/23165/Model%20Parental%20Time%20Sharing
%20Schedule%20_Out-of-state_.pdf;
Florida’s 15th Circuit Court website also uses this language in their model
orders for supervised visitation. Order For Supervised Visitation at Family
Nuturing Center, 15th JUDICIAL COURT OF FLORIDA (last visited Jan. 25, 2016),
https://15thcircuit.co.palmbeach.fl.us/documents/10179/104452/UFC_OrderforSupervisedVisitationFNC
.pdf.
Similarly, the time-sharing guidelines for the 7th Judicial Circuit in Florida,
adopted by administrative order in 2010, refer to residential and nonresidential
parents.
Seventh
Judicial
Circuit
of
Florida
Timesharing/Guidelines,
http://www.circuit7.org/Administrative%20Orders/family/FM-2010-041-SCattach.pdf.
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rebranding efforts is lacking.
The confusion as to the effect of the changes, whether they
were merely semantic or substantive, and inconsistency in
applying the appropriate terminology demonstrate a failure of
two of the elements of rebranding necessary to effectively create
positive impressions of the revisions.186 There was a lack of
understanding by the courts, attorneys, and litigants of the shift
in the value proposition and a lack of continuity with the prior
brand that provided for the designation of a primary residential
parent to the new brand that places more of an emphasis on coparenting and sharing of parenting time.
In discussing the expected benefit of the new terms
“parenting plans” and “time-sharing,” one Florida practitioner
suggested that the introduction of the terms “primary
residential parent” and “secondary residential parent” in 1982
in fact caused parents to ignore the best interests of their child.
187 Parents instead engage in protracted litigation in order to
“win” the primary designation, which was viewed as
“superior.”188 Just as there is scant empirical evidence that the
rejection of the term “custodial parent” in favor of a more neutral
term in 1982 with the adoption of the “primary residential
parent designation” resulted in any decrease in litigation
between warring parents,189 it is questionable whether the latest
nomenclature change will have a significant impact on the
nature of custody litigation in Florida, a fact recognized by even
those who were proponents of the legislative changes.190
186. See supra notes 47 & 51 and accompanying text.
187. Elisha D. Roy, The End of Custody in Florida: Finally Parents are
Just Parents, 82 FLA. B. J. 49, 49 (2008).
188. Id.
189. Several writers make the claim that the use of “custody” encourages
the adversarial nature of the litigation involving children after divorce, but do
not cite to authority for this claim. See, e.g., Michelle A. Tarnelli, Note, Joint
Custody Presumption in Vermont: A Proposal for Co-Parenting, 36 VT. L. REV.
1015, 1024 (2012).
190. Roy acknowledges that it is unlikely that the nomenclature changes
would have an impact on the nature of custody cases that were tried, but
opined that the number of custody trials would decline. Roy, supra note 187,
at 50. See also Alexa Welzien, Note & Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Parental Equality: Florida’s New Parenting Plan Remains Overshadowed by
Lingering Gender Bias, 33 NOVA L. REV. 509, 519 (2009) (quoting Florida Board
Certified in Marital and Family Law practitioner and then President-Elect of
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Roberta G. Stanley, as she
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This skepticism may be well-placed given the behavior of
litigants, practitioners, and judges. Regardless of what terms
are used, parents are cognizant that typically one parent is
receiving more time with the child, and will refer to their time
with the child as having “custody” of the child.191 Courts
acknowledge that there is still a difference in the amount of time
one parent is awarded using the new “time-sharing” vernacular;
because of the elimination of the “primary residential parent”
designation, many judges now award “majority time-sharing” to
one parent.192 Parents still litigate over who will have more
overnights with the child because of the financial impact on child
support.193 The amount of child support still remains linked to
the amount of time each parent spends with the child.194
By eliminating the definition of primary residential parent
the legislature also eliminated any definition of a “primary
residence” for the child.195 Notwithstanding the lack of a
definition, however, the child either “primarily” resides at one
parent’s residence, meaning more overnights are spent in that
parent’s home, or the child truly has no “primary” residence and
rotates equal amounts of time between the parents’ residences
in a joint physical custody arrangement.196 This fact will not be
changed by revisions in nomenclature. Without the designation
of a primary residential parent, neither parent then has
questioned whether the legislative changes would accomplish the goal of
reducing animosity and noted that parents already inclined to cooperate would
develop reasonable parenting plans, while those engaged in high conflict
litigation would likely experience increased conflict).
191. See supra note 178 & 181 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 176.
193. Christensen, supra note 181.
194. FLA. STAT. § 61.30 (2015). Until the amount of time a parent spends
with a child can be divorced from the amount of child support a parent is
expected to pay, mere changes in nomenclature are unlikely to have an impact
on parents’ behavior in custody matters.
195. The definition of the “principal residence of a child” “mean[ing] the
home of the designated primary residential parent” was stricken. 2008 Fla.
Laws 803. Perhaps an additional amendment should have been included
requiring that the minor child be instructed that, if questioned about where he
lives, he is to answer that he doesn’t live anywhere – he just shares time with
his parents.
196. Although FLA. STAT. § 61.121 (2007), which stated that the court was
permitted to order rotating custody, if found to be in the child’s best interest,
was repealed, it would appear that the repeal of the statute was related more
to the usage of the word “custody.” 2008 Fla. Laws 792.
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“visitation” with the child. Instead, there is a schedule of “timesharing” between each parent and the child as established in the
newly-created “parenting plan.”197 What is further significant
about the legislation is that parenting is now considered a duty,
rather than a privilege,198 a growing trend developing in the
United States addressed earlier.199
Even more complex difficulties exemplifying the lack of
continuity between the old brand and the new have arisen in
enforcement and modification actions in cases resolved under
the pre-2008 statute where one party was designated the
primary residential parent, with the non-residential parent
receiving a specified schedule of visitation.200 Supplemental
actions for enforcement or modification of judgments affecting
the placement of or contact with a child continues with those
designations, although the courts occasionally incorporate the
new nomenclature.201 In contrast, those parents whose initial
actions relating to a minor child were filed subsequent to the
effective date of the amendments no longer can be designated
the primary residential parent or awarded visitation.202
Similarly, in actions to enforce or modify out-of-state orders
197. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.046, 61.13 (2008).
198. FLA. STAT. § 61.45 (2008).
199. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
200. See Lombard v. Lombard, 997 So. 2d 1188, 1189-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (visitation is awarded to the non-custodial parent, when a primary
residential parent is designated; the primary residential parent does not have
visitation with the child; by definition, the child spends less time with the noncustodial parent).
201. See, e.g., Ginnell v. Pacetti, 31 So. 3d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(referring to both “time-sharing” and supervised “visitation” in a final order
following contempt hearings in September 2008 (pre-amendment) and January
2009 (post-amendment) based on a January 2008 final judgment); Rossman v.
Profera, 67 So. 3d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming modification of
“custody” of a minor child initially awarded to the mother pursuant to a
mediated settlement agreement in a 2004 divorce and designating the father
as the primary residential parent); Kershaw v. Kershaw, 141 So. 3d 642 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (considering modification of a “parenting plan” that
awarded “primary custody” to the mother and “visitation” to the father);
LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 571 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(“[b]ecause the relevant facts of this case took place both before and after the
amendments to Chapter 61, this opinion sets forth the history of this case using
the terms as they were used by the parties and the court during the course of
the proceedings below”).
202. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2008).
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or judgments domesticated in Florida, courts have incorporated
references to time-sharing while also referring to the custody
and visitation provisions of the sister state’s order.203 When
dealing with parties divorced pursuant to a foreign country’s
jurisdiction, however, there appears to be less of an interest in
using the new language.204
Because the prospective application of the amendments
does not eliminate the rights (and responsibilities) created under
judgments based on the prior statutory language205 a dual
system of “parenting” has been created. Those whose actions
pre-dated 2008 typically having a primary residential or
custodial parent for their child, a designation that continues
even if there have been subsequent modification actions, while
no parent whose action was initiated post-2008 has custody of
their child. If judges and lawyers are confused about the
differences in standards as evidenced in court opinions and court
filings, laypersons must be even more perplexed given that their

203. See, e.g., Cheek v. Hesik, 73 So. 3d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(ordering make-up “time-sharing” where the father’s “visitation” rights under
an Illinois divorce decree domesticated in Florida had been violated by the
mother who was awarded custody); Crittendon v. Davis, 89 So. 3d 1098 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing an order modifying a New Jersey judgment that
awarded the father “legal custody,” which the appellate court found was the
equivalent of sole parental responsibility under FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c), (3)
(2010), by awarding the parties shared parental responsibility and denying the
father holiday timesharing, which the court referred to as “visitation”); Edgar
v. Firuta, 100 So. 3d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
204. In Maguire v. Wright, the parties were divorced in the United
Kingdom in 2003 pursuant to a judgment that did not address child support or
time-sharing issues. The parties adopted an informal time-sharing schedule
not submitted to any court for approval. After both parties independently
relocated to Florida, the mother domesticated the foreign judgment and filed a
petition requesting the court to establish a parenting plan and award her
“primary time-sharing” with the children. The father requested equal timesharing, as well as additional relief. After the father failed to return the
parties’ youngest child following a trip to England, the mother sought
“immediate return and custody” of the child. The trial court’s order awarding
the mother “immediate . . . physical custody,” was affirmed and the case was
remanded for further proceedings on issues relating to parental responsibility
and “temporary time-sharing.” 157 So. 3d 493, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
205. Hahn v. Hahn, 42 So. 3d 945, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding
that applying the post-2008 statute in a modification action of a pre-2008
judgment would impermissibly impair mother’s rights as primary residential
parent); see also Bachman v. McLinn, 65 So. 3d 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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understanding is based on their perception of reality206
influenced by results in their friends’ divorces, not on the
theoretical underpinnings of the law.
The skeptical reaction of practitioners in Florida to the
nomenclature changes is not unique. Similar observations
followed the enactment of the Washington State Parenting Act,
one of the first state statutes to modify nomenclature associated
with custody actions and attempt to require parents to assume
responsibilities following a divorce.207 In analyzing the effect
statutory changes had following the adoption of the Washington
State Parenting Act, one scholar noted a wide divergence in the
perception of practitioners. Those who embraced the new
nomenclature perceived that elimination of the term “custody”
had a positive impact on reducing animosity between parents,
while others less inclined to use the new terminology insisted
that there had been no change in client behavior.208 The
reticence to embrace the changes is akin to employees who do
not adopt modified value propositions by a corporation, making
it difficult for the company to succeed in its rebranding efforts.209
Without creating the appropriate perception in practitioners and
judges that the new nomenclature and process provide an
enhanced benefit for divorcing families, the rebranding of the
process and post-divorce relationships between parents and
their child is unlikely to succeed.
One legal scholar, relying on surveys that indicate that only
5% of single mothers reported that fathers had a “‘great deal’ of
206. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
207. The public policy behind the act was expressed as follows: “Parents
have the responsibility to make decisions and perform other parental functions
necessary for the care and growth of their minor children.” WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.002 (West 2015). In discussing a social experiment that required
individuals to define the term “parent” when they were not advised what role
they would assume in a new society that included children, Czapanskiy
suggested the new definition would be: “a parent is the person who, by
procreation, conduct or adoption, enters into two commitments: [f]irst, a
commitment to a dependent human being to provide all the nurturance,
whether financial or nonfinancial, of which the person is capable; and second,
a commitment to deal respectfully and supportively with another person or
persons who are in a parental relationship with the same child.” Karen
Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Drafters: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1464 (1991).
208. Ellis, supra note 99, at 140-41, 178.
209. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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influence” over decisions concerning child-rearing and only 4%
stated that the fathers provided “‘a great deal’ of help” raising
the children, has questioned whether laws can positively
influence parental behavior by requiring divorcing parents to
work cooperatively to parent children.210 She does note,
however, that where statutes presume an award of joint physical
custody, more joint-parenting occurs and children perceive they
have a better relationship with each parent.211 Joint physical
custody typically is awarded where the parents tend to earn
greater incomes, have higher levels of education, and are
predisposed to co-parenting.212 With such small numbers of
parents being involved in parenting subsequent to divorce, such
laws, at best, will only impact a small number of parties,
primarily those already inclined to maintain a positive
relationship after separation. Although many states permit
joint custody arrangements, some states mandate, it and others
now require the adoption of “parenting plans,” surveys indicate
that cooperative co-parenting levels remain low.213 Practical
considerations, such a work schedules, geographic proximity,
time constraints and financial impact have an influence on the
success of co-parenting attempts.214
B.

“Custody”215 Has Not Been Totally Eliminated in Florida216

210. Marsha Garrison, Promoting Cooperative Parenting: Programs and
Prospects, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 265, 268 (2007).
211. Id. at 269.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 270.
214. Id. at 271.
215. The continued use of the term “custody” in criminal or delinquency
cases when referring to a minor child is beyond the scope of this article.
216. The problem with inconsistent or conflicting provisions in Florida’s
statutes dealing with children’s issues has been recognized in the past. In
1989, during a Special Session, the state legislature created the Commission
on Child Welfare to study specific child-related statutes, although Chapter 61
was not included in that list. 1990 Fla. Laws 12-13. In 1999, the Florida Bar
established the Commission on the Legal Needs of Children to study the legal
needs of children appearing in all state court divisions. Commission on the
Legal
Needs
of
Children,
THE
FLORIDA
BAR,
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBComm.nsf/840090c16eedaf0085256b610009
28dc/3ed599427239920385256ee70064e689!OpenDocument
(last
visited
August 20, 2015).
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The rebranding of custody litigation has not been successful
because the former terminology, with its layperson’s
understanding, continues to be used in the Florida Statutes.
Absent consistent use of the new branding throughout statutes
and the litigation process, it is difficult for the consumers, i.e.
parents, to embrace the new terminology and value proposition.
There is still meaning ascribed to being the custodial parent and
certain rights and obligations, separate from those that may be
designated in a parenting plan at the time of divorce, are
dependent upon that designation and denied to those who lack
it.
Although the term “custody” has been eliminated from those
statutes affecting disputes between parents for divorce actions
originating in Florida, it is still well-entrenched in the Florida
Statutes in connection with actions between parents and third
parties, dependency proceedings, rights and obligations that
flow from having “custody,” procedural matters, court and bar
rules, and statutes implicated federal and uniform laws. This
would not be an issue if there was some distinction of what
“custody” meant in those circumstances. Although several
statutes refer to “legal custody,”217 “actual custody,”218 or “actual
physical custody,”219 in most instances the terms remain
undefined. Whether these nomenclature differences in the
statutes have any significance is often difficult to determine.
Applying strict statutory construction principles, the
presumption is that the legislature did intend for the differences
to be legally significant; 220 as a practical matter, however,
absent a specific definition within the statute, it is likely the
differences across chapters does not imply the language
differences are legally significant.
1. “Custody” Remains in the Chapter 61 Divorce Statutes
217. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 622.55 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 743.067 (2015); FLA.
STAT. § 744.616 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 937.025 (2015).
218. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 383.50 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 402.17 (2015); FLA.
STAT. § 409.408 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 743.045 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 743.046 (2015);
FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (2015).
219. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 1003.20 (2015); FLA.
STAT. § 1012.22 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 937.025 (2015).
220. See Atlantis at Perdido Ass’n v. Warner, 932 So. 2d 1206, 1213 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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Although “custody” was eliminated in connection with child
placement issues arising in a divorce action, it still remains in
Chapter 61. The term can be found in sections addressing
jurisdiction issues,221 safeguards for the return of a child after
the exercise of time-sharing,222 temporary modifications
resulting from military service, 223 and electronic communication
between a parent and a child. 224 In each of these statutes, rights
and obligations are assigned to the person who has “custody” of
the child or is entitled to “visitation.”
2. Parents Cannot Have “Custody” of Their Child, but
Others Can
Although no parent in a divorce action filed after the
effective date of the 2008 amendments will be entitled to claim
“custody” of a child born to the parties,225 non-parent third

221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 751.02 & 61.501 et seq. (2015).
222. When there is sufficient risk that a parent may remove a child from
the state or the country after the adoption of a parenting plan and time-sharing
schedule, the court may enter an order, prohibiting the parent from “removing
or retaining the child in violation of a child custody determination.” FLA. STAT.
§ 61.45(3)(b)(2) (2015). The statute also permits the court to condition travel
outside the country upon a requirement that the party planning to travel with
the child obtain an order from the “foreign country containing terms identical
to the child custody determination issued in this country.” FLA. STAT. § 61.45(7)
(2015). Unlike FLA. STAT. § 61.13 where “parents” was substituted for
“parties,” FLA. STAT. § 61.45 continues to refer to the litigants in proceedings
involving parenting plans and time-sharing as the “parties.” Id.
223. Where a parent’s military service requires special consideration of
the time-sharing schedule, parents are required to mutually exchange
information and cooperate in resolving issues relating to “custody, visitation,
[and] delegation of visitation[.]” FLA. STAT. § 61.13002(3) (2015). In addition,
during a dissolution of marriage or “child custody” proceeding, courts can
delegate time-sharing privileges to a third-party when it is anticipated that
military service will interfere with the parent’s ability to exercise time-sharing.
,
224. Without proving that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances, required to modify a court order establishing a parenting plan
or time-sharing schedule, a “party to a child custody order” may seek an order
providing for electronic communication with the child if there is no prohibition
on such communication. FLA. STAT. § 61.13003(5) (2015).
225. This may raise constitutional equal protection claims, the
consideration of which are beyond the scope of this article.
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parties may still be awarded “custody” of that child.226 In
addition, temporary “custody” may be awarded to extended
family members, 227 “custody” is assigned in child dependency
actions to protect a child’s health, safety and welfare, 228 and
“custody” is awarded in adoption cases. 229
226. “The term “custody” was retained in Chapter 61 when used in the
context of awarding custody to a non-parent. See FLA. STAT. § 751.01 et seq.
(2013).” LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570, 576 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
227. An extended family member may be awarded temporary custody of a
child with the consent of the parents or if the family member is acting as a
substitute parent caring for the child on a full-time basis. FLA. STAT. §
751.02(1) (2015); see, e.g., Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014); D.M.M. v. J.M.M., 63 So. 3d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). As an
alternative, an extended family member that has had “physical custody” of the
child for a specified period of time, although not currently caring for the child
on a full-time basis, can be awarded concurrent custody. FLA. STAT. § 751.02(2)
(2015). If there is no objection from the parents to the award of custody to the
extended family member, the court applies the same standard used to establish
a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule for parents to award temporary or
concurrent custody – the best interests of the child. FLA. STAT. § 751.05(2)
(2015). If either parent does object, then the court cannot award concurrent
custody and must use a more stringent standard and find that there is clear
and convincing evidence that the child has been abused, abandoned, or
neglected as defined under FLA. STAT. Chapter 39 before making an award of
temporary custody. FLA. STAT. § 751.05(3) (2015). In those situations where
the court awards concurrent custody, then such award “may not eliminate or
diminish the custodial rights of the child’s parent or parents” and either or
both parents may obtain physical custody of the child. FLA. STAT. § 751.05(4)
(2015).
228. When a child is taken into state care to protect the child’s health,
safety, and welfare, the state agency responsible for the care is deemed to have
removed the child from “parental custody.” See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.001,
et seq. (2015); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(f) (2015). In addressing
permanency goals for a child that had been removed, if reunification is not
possible and parental rights are terminated, alternatives if adoption does not
occur with one year include “custody” to a relative or to a foster parent on a
permanent basis. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(j) (2015). In addition, under the
statute, to determine who has certain obligations to the child and due process
rights, the state looks to the person with “legal custody,” which is defined as “a
legal status created by a court which vests in a custodian of the person or
guardian . . . the right to have physical custody of the child” as well as other
defined rights and duties. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(34) (2015).
229. Adoptive parents receive custodial rights to a child and have a
constitutionally protected interest in retaining such rights. FLA. STAT. §
63.022(1)(d) (2015). Adoption considerations are governed by the best interests
of the child. FLA. STAT. § 63.022(2) (2015). Similarly, those requiring to consent
to the adoption include anyone who may claim to have rights to “custody” or
have “physical custody” or “lawful custody.” FLA. STAT. § 63.062 (2015); see also
FLA. STAT. § 63.082 (2015) (providing for execution or revocation of consent by
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3. Rights and Obligations Are Reserved for the Parent Who
Has “Custody”
Under Florida law, the parents, jointly, are the natural
guardians for a child.230 Prior to July 1, 2012, if the parents
divorced, the natural guardianship was vested in the parent
awarded custody; if joint custody was ordered, then both parents
continued to share natural guardianship.231 Despite changes to
Chapter 61 eliminating the designation of a custodial parent in
2008, it was not until 2012 that statutory amendments were
adopted revising the natural guardianship language to provide
that divorced parents with shared parental responsibility
continue as joint natural guardians; if one parent has been
awarded sole parental responsibility, that parent becomes the
natural guardian.232 Although the 2012 amendments struck
references to “custody” when dealing with divorcing parents, it
left intact the custodial parent designation for the mother of a
child born out of wedlock who is deemed the natural guardian of
the child and is entitled to “primary residential care and custody
of the child,” absent court order to the contrary.233
Certain rights and obligations are reserved for those
designated as the “custodial parent,” including the right to name
the child, 234 the allocation of health insurance benefits on behalf
of the child,235 the obligation to present the child for paternity
the person having “custody” of the child).
230. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (2015).
231. 2012 Fla. Laws 654.
232. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (2012).
233. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) 2012.
234. The right to designate the given name and surname of the child is
reserved to the mother and father who are listed on the birth certificate, when
the mother is married, or both parents have “custody” of the child, or the parent
who has “custody” if it is not jointly held by the parents; or whoever will have
custody of the child, if the mother was unmarried when the child was born.
FLA. STAT. § 382.013(3)(a)-(c) (2015).
235. The allocation of health insurance benefits for a child covered under
two or more policies when the child’s parents are divorced is based upon which
parent has “custody” of the child, with that parent’s policy providing coverage
first, that parent’s current spouse’s policy providing coverage next, and the
non-custodial parent’s policy being considered last. FLA. STAT. § 627.4235(4)(c)
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 627.6415(4) (2015). No changes have been made to the
statutes since the 2008 amendments to Chapter 61.
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testing, 236 the right to obtain medical treatment for the child, 237
and the ability to enroll a child in a school readiness program. 238

4. “Custody” is Still Relevant in Procedural Matters
Aside from issues relating to statutes that use the terms
“custody” or “visitation,” Florida’s procedural and bar rules
continue to use the term in connection with offering legal
services to military personnel, 239 informational filing when an
action is initiated, 240 the use of alternative dispute resolution
methods to resolve custody disputes, 241 the offer of settlement
rule, 242 and the obligation to appear for jury duty. 243
236. In administrative proceedings to establish paternity for purposes of
collecting child support, the mother or putative father who has “custody” of the
minor child must present the child for genetic testing as scheduled by the
state’s Department of Revenue. FLA. STAT. § 409.256(6)(a) (2015).
237. An individual who is an “unaccompanied homeless youth,”
unmarried, and the parent of a child with “actual custody” of the child can
consent to medical treatment of the child. FLA. STAT. § 743.067(3)(b)(2) (2015).
238. Children eligible for benefits under the School Readiness Program
include those who are in the “custody” of a homeless parent or a parent who is
the victim of domestic violence and is residing in a domestic violence center.
FLA. STAT. § 1002.81(1)(e) & (f) (2015).
239. In order to expand the availability of legal services to military
personnel in the state, military personnel licensed to practice in another state
are permitted to practice before Florida courts to provide representation in
domestic relations matters that include “child custody” actions. FLA. BAR REG.
R. 18-1.4(C)(3) (2015).
240. For case management purposes, petitioners must file a notice of
related cases in family cases, which include matters related to “custodial care
and access to children.” FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.545.
241. Disputes relating to “child custody” or “visitation” cannot be resolved
through voluntary binding arbitration or voluntary trial resolution. FLA. STAT.
§ 44.104(14) (2015). This was further emphasized in 2013, years after the
effective date of the 2008 amendments, when a new section was added to the
state arbitration code providing that the code does not apply to matters
relating to “child custody” or “visitation.” FLA. STAT. § 682.25 (2015). See also
FLA. STAT. § 682.014(3)(k) (2015) (providing that parties cannot waive the
exclusion from arbitration of disputes involving child custody or visitation).
Although arbitration is not an available dispute resolution mechanism, family
mediation can be used to resolve matters concerning “child custody” or
“visitation.” FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2)(d) (2015).
242. The offer of settlement rule does not apply to matters relating to
“child custody.” FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (2015).
243. Individuals who have “custody” of a child can also be excused from
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5. Designation of Custodial Parent Referenced in Uniform
Law, Federal Statutes, and International Conventions
Because most other states and countries continue to use
“custody” and “visitation” in their statutes, those references are
prevalent in uniform laws, federal statutes, and international
treaties and conventions. Florida has adopted a number of
uniform laws relating to children that ascribe rights and
responsibilities to parents. These statutes refer to “custody,”
“visitation,” “custodial parent,” or some variation. In order to
invoke the relief available under these statutes, some
designation or understanding of who is the custodial parent is
typically required. Some of these statutes include the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,244 the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,245 the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,246 and compliance with
the Federal Parent Locator Service.247
jury duty; those with “custody” who provide care at home for a child under the
age of ten can be relieved of federal petit and grand jury duty, M.D. FLA. JURY
PLAN 7.05(a)(2), while a parent who is not employed full-time and has “custody”
of a child under the age of six can be excused from serving on a state jury. FLA.
STAT. § 40.013(4) (2015).
244. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA), amended in 2002, controls jurisdiction in matters relating to “child
custody” and “visitation” proceedings. FLA. STAT. § 61.501, et seq. (2015). No
amendments have been made to the UCCJEA since its original adoption. Id.
The 2008 amendments require that all jurisdictional issues under the
UCCJEA must be addressed in the parenting plan and provides that a
parenting plan incorporated in a judgment or order is a custody determination
for purposes of the act. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13)(a)-(b) (2008).
245. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, adopted in
2009, includes definitions of a “non-custodial parent” and references “custody”
throughout the statute. FLA. STAT. § 409.401, et seq. (2015). No amendments
to revise references to the “custody” or “visitation” have been made since its
original adoption.
246. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) was originally
adopted in 1996. Despite amendments in 2011, which became effective in
2014, the act still provides that exercise of the remedies for support
enforcement available under the act does not give a court jurisdiction to issue
orders relating to “child custody or visitation.” FLA. STAT. § 88.1031(2)(b)
(2015).
247. In actions brought to release information pursuant to the Federal
Parent Locator Service, notwithstanding family violence indicators, location
disclosure is permitted to state agents or attorneys and judges who can bring
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There are also a number of federal statutes that reference
rights and obligations imposed upon custodial and non-custodial
parents, including the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,248
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,249 the Indian Child Welfare
Act,250 Veterans’ benefits for dependents, 251 and the Internal
Revenue Code.252 “Custody” also continues to be used in
international treaties and conventions, most notably the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child

or hear actions to “enforce a child custody or visitation determination or order
establishing a parenting plan.” FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.650(b)(1) & (2). The
Committee Note to the rule explains that the 2008 amendments:
[E]liminated such terms as ‘custodial parent,’ ‘noncustodial
parent,’ and ‘visitation’ from Chapter 61, Florida Statutes.
Instead, the court adopts or establishes a parenting plan that
includes, among other things, a time-sharing schedule for the
minor children. These statutory changes are reflected in the
amendments to the definitions in this rule. However,
because 42 U.S.C. § 653 includes the terms ‘custody’ and
‘visitation,’ these terms have not been excised from the
remainder of the rule.
Id.
248. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) refers exclusively
to custody and visitation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 633 (2012).
The 2008 amendments require that the parenting plan agreed to by the parties
or adopted by the court must address jurisdictional issues under the PKPA.
FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13)(a) (2008).
249. Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, there are certain
restrictions on a court’s power to act in custody actions involving a
servicemember who is being deployed. See 50 U.S.C. § 3938 (2012).
250. The Indian Child Welfare Act addresses the policy that Indian
children removed from their families should be placed in the custody of
individuals that will support and promote values inherent in the Indian
culture. 25 U.S.C. § 1902, et seq. (2012).
251. Life insurance coverage and benefits available to children of veterans
are dependent upon which parent has “legal custody” of the child. 38 U.S.C. §
1967(a)(4)(B) (2012).
252. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the entitlement to claim a
personal exemption of a child on federal tax returns following the parents’
divorce hinges on which parent has “custody,” and whether that parent has
executed the appropriate forms to allow the “noncustodial” to claim the
dependent child. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)-152(e)(1)-(2) (2012). The “custodial parent”
is “the parent having custody for the greater portion of the calendar year,”
while the “noncustodial parent” is “the parent who is not the custodial parent.”
I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012).
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Abduction.253 For example, the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA),254 implementing the Hague Convention,
refers to “custody” and “visitation.”255
VI. “Custody” Rebranding Implications and Suggestions for
Implementation
An examination of Florida’s experience in rebranding
“custody” litigation suggests that such efforts have not been
wholly successful. The new “custody” brand, characterized by
revised nomenclature, including “parenting plans” and
“parenting time,” has a commendable value proposition to
reduce animosity between parents throughout the divorce
process and as they co-parent after divorce. This is a worthy
goal based on research indicating that children in families who
continue to experience a high level of conflict after divorce fare
poorly in terms of health, behavior, and educational
achievement.256 On the other hand, children who experiences
cooperative co-parenting enjoy a higher level of contact with
each parent and more positive relationships.257
The new standards developed to reduce the animosity
associated with custody litigation fundamentally alter custody
dispute resolution by requiring parents to assume the primary
253. Hague Conven. on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(1980) T.I.A.S. No. 11670; 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
254. 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2012).
255. ICARA defines “rights of access” under the Convention as “visitation
rights.” 22 U.S.C. § 9002(7) (2012). The act also defines “rights of custody”
maintained by “an individual or legal custodian” as “rights of care and custody
of a child, including the right to determine the place of residence of a child,
under the laws of the country in which the child is a habitual resident” that
are awarded through “operation of law,” court order, or the parties’ agreement.
22 U.S.C. § 9101(21) (2012). In addition, relief under the act after a child has
been wrongfully removed to another country is invoked by the “left-behind
parent,” who is “an individual or legal custodian who alleges that an abduction
has occurred that is in breach of rights of custody attributed to such
individual.” 22 U.S.C. § 9101(15) (2012). In order to allow for invocation of the
relief afforded under the Hague Convention, the definitions adopted at the time
of the 2008 amendments provide that “custody” rights under the convention
are determined by the parenting plan agreed to by the parties or adopted by
the court. FLA. STAT. § 61.046(13)(c) (2008).
256. Garrison, supra note 210 at 265.
257. Id. at 267-68.
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responsibility for resolving their disputes through the creation
of a parenting plan.258 These revised standards and the modified
verbiage replacing “custody” and “visitation” are the equivalent
of a company’s new value proposition.259 The brand promise
being offered by the “sellers” (the state legislators, judges, and
lawyers) is that the “consumers” (parents and their children)
will experience a less contentious divorce and post-divorce, coparenting relationship if the new standards are implemented.
The import of changes in terminology, however, are often
lost by parents.
Terms associated with child custody
determinations have been repeatedly modified and include:
custody, visitation, parental responsibility, shared parenting,
legal custody, physical custody, primary residence, primary
residential parent, secondary residential parent, non-residential
parent, and the list goes on. These terms themselves are often
ill-defined.260 As new terminology has been adopted by state
legislatures, those “selling” custody determinations—lawyers
and judges—have adapted better than parents,261 the ultimate
“consumers” who must abide by the decisions. Parents continue
to speak in terms of “custody” and “visitation,” regardless of the
nomenclature du jour.262 In addition, there is at least anecdotal
evidence that use of the new terminology requiring the
development of parenting plans has the opposite of the intended
effect, increasing acrimony between parents forced to resolve
detailed minutiae relating to parenting decisions.263
Those responsible for child custody reform have done a poor
job educating the public about the benefits to be gained by not
258. Singer, supra note 81, at 184. Singer argues that the adoption of
parenting plan requirements has shifted the focus of custody litigation from
“allocating custodial rights and obligations” to “‘planning’ for children’s future
needs.” Id. at 186-87. See also Elizabeth S. Scott, Planning for Children and
Resolving Custodial Disputes: A Comment on the Think Tank Report, 52 FAM.
CT. REV. 200, 200 (2014) (praising the Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts’ Think Tank on Research, Policy, Practice, and Shared Parenting for
maintaining that family decisions should be made by parents, not the courts).
259. See GRONLUND, supra note 33.
260. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
263. Jane W. Ellis, Book Review, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 253,
261 (1996) (reviewing CARLA B. GARRITY & MITCHELL A. BARIS, CAUGHT IN THE
MIDDLE: PROTECTING THE CHILDREN OF HIGH CONFLICT DIVORCE (1994)).
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thinking in terms of “custody” and “visitation,” and “winning”
and “losing” custody, after a divorce.264 There has been no
attempt to rebrand “custody” that would allow consumers to
form a favorable impression of terms such as “parenting plans”
and “parenting time” because, in most instances, the first time
parents are exposed to such concepts is when they are in the
divorce lawyer’s office, a time when they are often in a highly
agitated emotional state. While the promise of an amicable
divorce may be appealing, parents’ perception of “custody” has
been ingrained through, literally, hundreds of years of
conditioning that “losing custody” implies the existence of
negative character traits that led to such a result.265 In many
instances, those in the process of divorcing now were the
children of divorce in the 1970s and later years, when having a
primary caretaking parent, typically the mother, was the
norm.266 Having personally lived through that experience, it is
not surprising that adaptation to new standards and
terminology is slow to occur when what is demanded is a
fundamental change in culture.267 Changing the nomenclature
may cause some parents to “feel better” about their continued
status as parents after divorce, but underlying emotional
responses to custody disputes still remain.268 Despite the demise
264. Parenting education classes, required in some jurisdictions, address
the impact divorce has on children and encourage less adversarial conflict
resolution. Singer, supra note 81, at 188. A four-hour class, however, cannot
be expected to undo deeply-ingrained beliefs about custody, visitation, and
parental rights. Given the claim that 35% of parents have chronically
conflicted co-parenting styles, the efficacy of these classes is questionable. See
Sullivan, supra note 96, at 19.
265. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of
Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q.
815, 816 (1999) (suggesting that concepts of “custody” were traditionally based
on social status hierarchy with possessory interest being vested in the family
patriarch).
266. Warshak, supra note 78, at 92-93.
267. See generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared
Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 22526 (2014).
268. Mabry, supra note 92, at 242. See also GITLIN ON DIVORCE: A GUIDE
TO ILLINOIS MATRIMONIAL LAW § 1.4 (LexisNexis 2012) (suggesting that
nomenclature changes in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
are “cosmetic” and “do not in any way eliminate the acrimony from
matrimonial law proceedings . . . . The acrimonious nature of most matrimonial
law proceedings should be recognized as a reality that will not change.”).
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of the “tender years” doctrine and legislative shifts to shared
parenting standards, popular culture still often views the
mother as the person who should, and typically does, receive
custody of a minor child.269
During the emotional upheaval of a divorce, parents’
conduct is susceptible to influences from third parties, including
their lawyers. Their expectations of outcomes are colored by
lawyers’ representations and generally are much higher at the
outset of the case and ebb towards settlements reached through
compromise as the case progresses.270 In many instances, the
lawyers responsible for managing client expectations have
themselves not adapted to the new terminology mandated by
statutory changes.271
The rebranding of custody litigation is also hampered by the
slow adoption of nomenclature changes by the courts and
practitioners because the substantive import of the changes is
not always clear272 and there is a lack of consistency in
terminology across statutory provisions affecting children.273 In
addition, there is little evidence that these changes have any
significant impact on the decisions ultimately rendered by
courts or through settlements.274 In fact, some experts posit that
269. The lyrics in I’m So Happy I Can’t Stop Crying, a song penned by
Sting and recorded as a duet with Toby Keith in 1997, state:
Saw my lawyer, Mr Good News
He got me joint custody and legal separation
* * *
The park is full of Sunday fathers and melted ice cream
We try to do the best within the given time
A kid should be with his mother
Everybody knows that
What can a father do but baby-sit sometimes??”
STING, I’m So Happy I Can’t Stop Crying, on DREAM WALKIN’ (Mercury 1997).
Similarly, the 2008 Zac Brown Band song, Highway 20 Ride, written by Wyatt
Durrette and lead singer, Zachary Brown, describes a divorced father driving
on the highway every other Friday to visit his son in a different state.
270. Gary Skoloff & Robert J. Levy, Custody Doctrines and Custody
Practice: A Divorce Practitioner’s View, 36 FAM. L.Q. 79, 81-82 (2002).
271. Christensen, supra note 181, at 4.
272. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
273. See discussion supra Section V.B.
274. Skoloff & Levy, supra note 270, at 84-85; Robert Mnookin, Child
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settlement terms are often not grounded on the legal principles
contained in statutes governing custody cases.275 Consequently,
the statutory principles and nomenclature may have little
bearing on strategies employed by practitioners and parents’
assessment of the ultimate goals to be achieved.
Rebranding is necessary if changes in custody standards are
to be successful because clients and their lawyers do not speak
the same language and do not share similar motivations.
Clients bring to their interactions with lawyers .
. . a ‘natural attitude’ or an ‘attitude of everyday
life.’ In this attitude the way the world appears is
accepted as the way the world really is. The self is
perceived to be at the center of society and events
are interpreted in terms of their impact on the
self. Lawyers, on the other hand, might be
expected to think of motives and actions in . . .
‘rational-purposive’ terms in which technical rules
and a problem-solving orientation are more
important than emotional reactions and
justifications of self.276
This disconnect is fueled throughout the professional
relationship as lawyers focus on the legal aspects of the divorce
governed by rules and statutes, a language that is foreign to
clients, and clients focus on the emotional and social impact of
divorce, facets that are meaningless to the lawyer.277 The shift
in attitude, then, is where the rebranding of custody must focus.
Achieving the goal of reducing the number of custody cases
Custody Revisited, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 263 (2014).
275. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1352 (1994);
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979); Skoloff & Levy, supra
note 271, at 89-90 (discussing views that lawyers who act as “counselors” in
divorce cases promote compromise, while “advocates” strive for the most
favorable outcome).
276. Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations:
Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 737,
739-40 (1988).
277. Id. at 764.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/2

56

2016

CHILD “CUSTODY” LITIGATION

431

that are litigated and decreasing the level of animosity in those
cases has been elusive. This is a cautionary tale for those states
contemplating changes in nomenclature, including eliminating
the recognized “custody” brand, to consider some of the
challenges faced in Florida. When the new nomenclature and
parenting plan design were introduced, there were no efforts to
modify parental social behavior to embrace the new terminology
and the new paradigm for resolving custody disputes through
rebranding. Successful corporate rebranding typically involves
extensive market analysis as symbols of the new brand and the
value proposition itself are developed and test-marketed.278 The
modifications to the “custody” brand did not undergo any such
testing. Although legislators, jurists, practitioners, and mental
health professionals were involved in the process as statutory
amendments were proposed,279 the ultimate consumers, the
parents affected by the new legislation, generally were not
consulted. Instead, the new paradigm was foisted upon them
with little attention being given to the need to introduce the new
concepts and develop strategies to gain the favorable public
impression needed for a successful rebranding. As a result,
parents continue to use the terms “custody” and “visitation,”
while practitioners and judges give at least an attempt to utilize
the new terminology, although not convinced that it has any
effect on the course of litigation or the ultimate outcomes
achieved.280 In short, there was no attempt to develop a new
“attitude” consistent with the new brand.281
For those states contemplating a new brand that eschews
“custody” and “visitation,” implementing the following four
proposals could make the rebranding goal attainable and
provide for an acceptance of the new value proposition as one
that provides significant benefits for a family following a divorce:
1) create a marketing campaign that explains the benefits under
the new paradigm; 2) allow for a period of transition as parents
acclimate to the new nomenclature and co-parenting
278. Jim Makos, SWOT Analysis to Help with Branding and Marketing,
PESTLEANALYSIS (Mar. 6, 2015), http://pestleanalysis.com/swot-analysis-inbranding-marketing/.
279. Roy, supra note 187.
280. See supra note 190; see also notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
281. See note 65 and accompanying text.
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expectations; 3) use the new nomenclature consistently
throughout state statutes; and 4) invest in developing “buy-in”
from stakeholders, primarily lawyers and judges, early in the
process.
A.

Marketing Campaign

Despite the revisions to the Florida Statutes adopting
“parenting plans” and “time-sharing,” pro se litigants continue
to use the words “custody” and “visitation” in their court
filings.282 These are terms familiar to parents and ones used
throughout history. The general public is unaware of the shifts
in nomenclature and standards used in custody determinations,
although litigants are exposed to the different terminology when
they retain counsel and attend parenting classes required in
many states afford opportunities to introduce the new
concepts.283 By then, however, social behavior and perceptions
of what is involved in divorce and custody litigation have already
been ingrained through the priming process discussed by Calder
when explaining behavior reactions to branding.284 Expecting
these social norms to change during the divorce process when
emotions run high is unrealistic.
As seen in the ineffective rebranding of JC Penney, changes
in the value proposition that exceed the understanding of the
public are unlikely to gain acceptance.285 In that situation,
education of the consumer was required before the new pricing
strategy could have been successful. Similarly, if rebranding of
custody litigation is to succeed, parents must be afforded an
opportunity to develop familiarity with the new terms and the
import of the process of custody determinations before the new
value proposition can be expected to receive favorable
acceptance.
To effectuate change, then, there must be a cultural shift
282. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. This is similar to the
continued use of “divorce,” although the terminology was changed to
“dissolution of marriage” in 1971. See supra note 142.
283. See Francis J. Catania, Learning from the Process of Decision: The
Parenting Plan, 2001 BYU L. REV. 857, 884 n.167 (2001).
284. Goldenberg, supra note 133.
285. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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that occurs before parents are in the process of divorcing and
resolving issues relating to shared parenting. Just as public
health officials now use marketing campaigns to effectuate
change in social behavior, exposing the general public to changes
in co-parenting expectations post-divorce can be a viable vehicle
for change. Public health announcements targeting smokers
have proven to be effective, although directed at a much smaller
audience286 than the approximately 36% of married adults who
will eventually divorce.287
Managing expectations before
parents enter the divorce process can ease the rebranding
procedure.
Although most divorces cases settle without judicial
intervention, as noted earlier, a small percentage of divorcing
couples engage in high-conflict litigation, especially over issues
affecting custody of a minor child.288 A small percentage of this
group continue in their acrimonious conduct, to the detriment of
their children, long after the divorce decree has been entered,
but others do settle into a relative state of calm within a few
years after the divorce.289 Perhaps it is this latter group that can
be targeted and will benefit the most from social behavior
marketing. The truly highly conflicted parents will be unlikely
to respond, just as some consumers will never form a positive
image of a product, no matter how successful the branding
campaign may otherwise be.290
B.

Transition Period

Consideration needs to be given to the transition in both
nomenclature and custody standards to allow parents the
286. In 2013, 17.8% of U.S. adults reportedly smoked. Bahar Gholipour,
Smoking US Declines to All-Time Low, LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.livescience.com/48923-usa-smoking-declines-to-lowest.html.
287. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the
average United States divorce rate for the forty-four states and the District of
Columbia that reported data is 36%. FastStats Marriage and Divorce, CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm (last updated June 19,
2014).
288. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
290. Calder, supra note 58 at 12.
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opportunity to recognize the benefits afforded by the new value
proposition. In Florida, the change from a parent’s right to be
designated the “primary residential parent” to instead having
“time-sharing” with a child occurred overnight. For actions filed
on September 30, 2008 the prior statute using the familiar
vernacular of “custody,” “visitation,” and “primary residential
parent” governed, regardless of when the case was resolved
through settlement or judicial decree; for those who filed their
action the following day, October 1, 2008, an entirely new
scheme involving parenting plans and a time-sharing schedule
was required.291 Explaining the difference in rights and
obligations in a fundamental relationship like that of parentchild caused by the difference of one day placed practitioners in
a difficult position. These problems may have been further
exacerbated and will continue into the future because those who
were divorced under the old regime still have the prior statute
applied in modification and enforcement cases; these cases
continue to use “custody,” and “visitation,” although some courts
toss in the new terms for extra measure.292 This dichotomy can
conceivably continue until 2026, when infants born in 2008
whose parents filed for divorce before October 1 of that year will
finally turn eighteen and the court will lose jurisdiction over
their parenting issues.293
Although the enforcement and modification of pre-2008
amendment cases in Florida justify using the former
terminology under the theory that rights once granted should
not be removed by subsequent litigation, that argument should
be discounted. Its effect is to create a class of persons with
“custodial” rights that are denied to another class of persons as
a result of an arbitrary effective date selected by the legislature.
Given that parenting is a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution,294 there should be no divergence in parental rights.
291. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
293. The age of majority in Florida is eighteen. FLA. STAT. § 743.07(1)
(2015). Actions could still continue for another year, however, because the child
support obligation can continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday if the
child is still enrolled in high school with an expectation of graduating by the
child’s nineteenth birthday. FLA. STAT. § 743.07(2) (2015).
294. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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For actions that come before the court for enforcement, and
especially for modification subsequent to the enactment of
statutes rebranding custody litigation, consideration should be
given to requiring compliance with the new statutory provisions.
In addition, rather than requiring the mandates of the statute
to have prospective application to actions filed subsequent to the
effective date of the modification, consideration should be given
to make the revisions control all cases resolved subsequent to
the effective date. If the goal is the reduction of litigation and
post-decretal animosity, then the purported benefits of the
statutory revisions should not be denied to those who filed for
divorce prior to the statute’s enactment. This method of
application will, to some extent, avoid the cliff effect that a filing
date demarcation has, ease the transition to the new
nomenclature, and ensure that all cases heard subsequent to the
effective date apply the same standard, reducing confusion for
parents, lawyers, and judges.
C.

Consistency

Florida’s statutes provide a good example of the problems of
lack of consistency in branding for the public to understand the
brand.295 The statutes are replete with references to “custody”
as a right afforded to parents in certain circumstances and to
third parties in other. The term “custody” carries with it legal
significance because it provides to the designee rights to indicia
of parenthood, such as naming a child and providing medical
care.296 When the custodial parent is the one responsible for
providing medical insurance, but neither parent is named the
custodial parent, confusion and the likelihood of future litigation
can be increased rather than lessened. At best, the words
themselves can be rendered meaningless if they are viewed
simply as nomenclature changes and not a shift in the value
proposition.297
In addition, under uniform, federal, and
295. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of consistency in branding).
296. See discussion supra Section V.B.3.
297. See supra note 190. Although the primary residential parent
designation was eliminated, judges now refer to one parent having majority
time-sharing. See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 87 So. 3d 820, 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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international laws, certain rights are reserved for the “custodial”
parent. Introducing foreign terms such as “parenting plan” and
“time-sharing,” while prohibiting an award of custody, creates
confusion and a justifiable concern that parental rights are being
lost, despite the adoption of statutes to allow for implementation
of relief afforded under those laws referring to “custody.”
D. Stakeholder Buy-In
Marketing experts recommend bringing employees into the
rebranding process early so their support for changes in the
value proposition can be developed making them its ardent
spokespersons.298
The weak acceptance of nomenclature
changes and shifts in the custody standards in Florida is not
atypical of attorney reaction to attempts to rebrand custody
litigation.299 This may be a function of the System 2 thinking
process discussed by Calder that requires “work” to change
perceptions by considering the proposal, evaluating
alternatives, and then favorably accepting the new value
proposition.300 Adapting to changes in nomenclature and a
process that had been in place for over a quarter of a century in
Florida proved to be a slow transformation for attorneys and
judges.301
Aside from the behavioral science behind the difficulties
individuals experience with change, is the educational
underpinnings of most divorce lawyers. Legal education is only
now becoming more interdisciplinary and looking to social
science and psychology as fields with which attorneys must have
more than a casual acquaintance.302 As lawyers are expected to
2012). While primary and majority may not be true synonyms, neither term
can be viewed as neutral because they both clearly imply that one parent has
more time with the child than the other. This fact will continue to cause
litigation, especially because of the child support implications. See supra notes
193-194 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notesnote 47-48 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 190, 205187 and accompanying text..
300. See Calder, supra note 58.
301. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
302. See generally Joan B. Kelly & Mary Kay Kisthardt, Helping Parents
Tell Their Children about Separation and Divorce: Social Science Frameworks
and the Lawyer’s Counseling Responsibility, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 315
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assume more of a counseling role, they must assume the task of
convincing clients of the efficacy of the new nomenclature and
co-parenting expectations. Unfortunately, they themselves may
not be inclined to endorse the new paradigms as capable of
delivering on the value proposition that custody disputes can be
resolved with less acrimony. Education of lawyers and judges
then would be vital to success in the rebranding process.
VII. Conclusion
The promise of a less contentious divorce is a value
proposition that most, if not all, would embrace. With the
current trend in custody litigation that has resulted in
nomenclature changes and revisions in custody standards,
efforts to achieve that brand promise could benefit from
implementation of business branding principles. In order to
shift the focus away from “winning custody” to a paradigm that
promotes co-parenting and eschew labels, all of the participants
in custody disputes, including lawyers and judges, but most
importantly parents, must view the changes as providing a
favorable benefit.
Rebranding concepts that focus on promoting an
understanding of the new value proposition through social
behavior marketing, allowing for an orderly transition to the
new paradigm, using consistent branding across all statutes,
and encouraging adoption by all stakeholders can be
implemented to foster acceptance of the new value proposition.
Simply adopting significant statutory revisions results in
confusion by the courts, attorneys, and litigants, making it
unlikely that the goals sought will be reached. Successfully
rebranding custody litigation as a system to establish parenting
plans and apportion parenting time without acrimony or judicial
intervention can become the “Healthy Choice” of divorcing
parents.

(2009); see also Catherine J. Ross, Choosing a Text for the Family Law
Curriculum of the Twenty-First Century, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 584 (2006), for
discussions on the need to reform legal education in the family law arena.
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